Louisiana Law Review
Volume 57
Number 2 Winter 1997

Article 5

2-1-1997

Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State Law: The
Louisiana Environmental Quality Act
Kenneth M. Murchison

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev
Part of the Law Commons

Repository Citation
Kenneth M. Murchison, Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State Law: The Louisiana
Environmental Quality Act, 57 La. L. Rev. (1997)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol57/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

Enforcing Environmental Standards Under State Law: The
Louisiana Environmental Quality Act
Kenneth M.Murchison"
In the United States, analysis of environmental law tends to concentrate on
federal law. The focus is understandable given the primacy of federal law in the
field and the diversity of state environmental statutes. Nonetheless, the focus is
unfortunate with respect to enforcement issues. Major federal statutes envision that
states will assume primary responsibility for routine enforcement, subject always
to the oversight of the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).'
Understanding state law relating to enforcement is, therefore, an essential step for
evaluating the effectiveness ofpollution control legislation in the United States.
This Article analyzes the statutory provisions for enforcing environmental
standards in Louisiana. After a brief overview of the state's constitutional
protection for the environment and the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act,' the
Article describes the methods the Act provides for detecting violations; analyzes
the statute's provisions for administrative sanctions and emergency orders, civil
actions initiated by the government, criminal prosecutions, and enforcement by
private parties; and compares the state provisions to analogous provisions of federal
law. It concludes with an assessment ofthe effectiveness ofthe state enforcement
devices together with some suggestions for reform.
1. POLLUTION CONTROL STANDARDS IN LOUISIANA: AN OVERVIEW

A. The ConstitutionalDuty to ProtectNatural Resources
The Louisiana Constitution establishes environmental preservation as the
public policy of the state. It directs that the "natural resources of the state,
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including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality
of the environment" are to "be protected, conserved, and replenished."
Moreover, it mandates the legislature to "enact laws to implement this policy."'
The constitutional policy is not absolute. Other economic and social needs
of the community temper it. Nonetheless, the obligation imposed by the
constitution is a substantial one. It commits the state to the protection,
conservation, and replenishment of its natural resources "insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people."'
Save Ourselves, Inc. v.Louisiana Environmental Control Commission' is the
leading decision interpreting the constitutional mandate. In Save Ourselves,
Justice Dennis-writing for a unanimous Louisiana Supreme Court-construed
the constitutional provision as continuing "the public trust doctrine ' 6 established
in the 1921 Constitution
According to. Justice Dennis, the effect of this
continuation of the public trust doctrine is to impose "a duty of environmental
protection on all state agencies and officials" and to establish "a standard of
environmental protection" as well as to mandate "the legislature to enact laws to
implement fully this policy." s
The Save Ourselves opinion also recognized the significance of the
qualifying language in the constitutional text. The obligation imposed by the
state constitution is, Justice Dennis explained, "a rule of reasonableness."
Although the constitution "does not establish environmental protection as an
exclusive goal," it does require "a balancing process in which environmental
costs and benefits must be given full and careful consideration along with
economic, social and other factors."'
B. The Environmental Quality Act
1. Statutory Framework
To fulfill its obligations to enact laws to protect the natural resources of the
state, the legislature has enacted the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act.'0

3.

La. Const. art. IX, § I.

4. Id.
5. 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 1984).
6. Id. at 1154. See generallyJoseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrinein Natural Resource Law,
68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); James G. Wilkins & Michael Wascom, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Louisiana, 52 La. L. Rev. 861 (1992); Robert E. Tarc-a, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine As
a Basis for Environmental Litigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. Rev. 469 (1981). But see Lee
Hargrave, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53 La. L. Rev. 1535 (1993).
7. La. Const. of 1921 art. VI, § I.
8. Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1156.
9. Id. at 1157.
10. La. R.S. 30:2001.2391 (1989 and Supp. 1996). In 1979, the legislature enacted the

Louisiana Environmental Affairs Act, which consolidated administration of most of the state's
environmental protection programs in the Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of
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Although the Act is "modeled in part" on federal statutes, the "Louisiana
regulatory framework is also based on state constitutional provisions and the
public trust concept.""
The Environmental Quality Act includes most ofthe state's pollution control
and environmental remediation laws. Substantively, the Act combines state
legislation regarding air and water 3 pollution, the management and disposal
of solid" and hazardous" waste, and releases of hazardous. substances 6 into
one comprehensive act.'" It also creates the Department of Environmental
Quality, "the primary agency in the state concerned with environmental
protection and regulation," to administer the Act.'
The organizational head of the department is its secretary.' 9 In addition to
vesting in the secretary "all incidental powers necessary or proper to carry out
the purposes of [the Environmental Quality Act]," the statute specifically grants
the secretary broad enforcement powers when violations occur.
To assist the secretary in carrying out the directives in the legislation, the
Act provides for four assistant secretaries." Three of the assistant secretaries
direct substantive programs;' the fourth is responsible for legal affairs and
The assistant secretaries have "immediate supervision and
enforcement.'

Natural Resources with a right of appeal to the Environmental Control Commission. See 1979 La.
Acts No. 449. Four years later, the legislature created the Department of Environmental Quality and
renamed the statute the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act. 1983 La. Acts No. 97, § 1,adding
La. R.S. 30:1061 (now redesignated at La. R.S. 30:2011) and amending La. R.S. 30:1051 (now
redesignated as La. R.S. 30:2001). In 1984, the legislature abolished the Environmental Control
Commission and transferred its powers to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality.
1984 La. Acts No. 795, § 1,adding La. R.S. 30:1062 (now redesignated as La. R.S. 30:2013). See
generally Charles S. McCowan, Jr., The Evolution of Environmental Law in Louisiana, 52 La. L.

Rev. 907, 913-15 (1992).
11. Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 U.S. at 1158.
12. La. R.S. 30:2051-2059 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
13. La. K.S. 30:2071-2078 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
14. La. K.S. 30:2151-2156, 2291-2295 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
15. La. R.S. 30:2171-2206, 2241-2253 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
16. La. R.S. 30:2171-2206, 2271-2280 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
17. Not all environmental protection legislation is part of the Environmental Quality Act. The
Commissioner of Agriculture administers the state pesticide laws, see La. R.S. 3:3201-3377 (1987);
the Department of Public Safety and Corrections is responsible for regulating the transportation of
hazardous substances, see La. R.S. 30:2189, 32:1501-21 (1989); and the Department of Natural
Resources is responsible for coastal zone management, underground injection of hazardous wastes,
and surface mining. See La. R.S. 30:4.1, 901-32; 49:214.1-.41 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
18. La. R.S. 30:2011(A) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
19. La. KS. 30:2011(B) (1989).
20. Like other state agencies, the Department of Environmental Quality also has an office of
management and finance, which is headed by an undersecretary, and the secretary can also appoint
a deputy secretary. See La. R.S. 36:231(C), 235, 236 (1985 and Supp. 1996).
21. La. R.S. 36:201 i(CX1)(a)-(c) (1985 and Supp. 1996); see also La. R.S. 36:237, 238 (1985
and Supp. 1996).
30:2011(C)(1)(d) (1989).
22. La. .S.
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direction" of the offices they head, 3 and they may exercise "such powers and
'
duties as are assigned to them by the secretary or by law."24
2. Detection of Violations
One of the primary methods for discovering when environmental regulations
have been violated is to require the violators to report the violations.. The
Environmental Quality Act contains a general reporting requirement applicable
to all violators.' Various substantive chapters add additional mandates to
report specific types of violations.26
The department also has broad investigatory powers."
Department
personnel have access'to facilities and records of regulated entities. They can
also conduct tests and meet with alleged violators to determine if violations have
occurred and, when violations are uncovered, to decide how the department
should respond.
One of the most important aspects of the department's investigatory powers
is the authority to inspect facilities of persons who are covered by the Environmental Quality Act. 28 The Act's authorization for inspections confers considerable authority on departmental personnel to conduct warrantless inspections,
but-for the reasons explained below--constitutional concerns may encourage
a narrow interpretation of the statute if it is challenged judicially.
3. Enforcement Alternatives
A violation of the Environmental Quality Act or its implementing regulations
is the essential prerequisite for the imposition of administrative or judicial
sanctions under the statute. Before initiating an enforcement action, the
department must determine that a violation of a preexisting requirement has
occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.29 However, for most enforcement

23. La. R.S. 30:2011(CX2) (1989).
24. La. RS. 30:2011(G) (1989).
25. La. R.S. 30:2025(l) (1989); see infra note 48 and accompanying text.
26. See La. R.S. 30:2060(H), 2077, 2107(B), 2183(1), 2204(A)(1), 2361, 2373 (1989 and Supp.
1996); 32:1510 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
27. La. R.S. 30:2011(D)(5), (13), (14), 2054(A)(2), 2074(A)(2) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see
infra notes 72-92 and accompanying text.
28. La. R.S. 30:2012 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 93-126 and accompanying text.
29. La. R.S. 30:2025(C) (Supp. 1996) (emergency cease and desist orders, compliance orders,
and notices of violation), 2025(E) (1989 and Supp. 1996) (civil penalties), 2025(F) (Supp. 1996)
(criminal prosecutions), 2025(G) (1989 and Supp. 1996) (civil actions); Environmental Control
Comm'n v. Browning-Fernis Industries, Inc., 450 So. 2d 1292, 1299 (La. 1984); Office of
Environmental Affairs v..McWhorter &Assoc., Inc., 449 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
A "viol tion" is "a failure to comply with the requirements of [the Environmental Quality Act], the
rules issued under [the Act], and conditions of permits.. " La. R.S. 30:2004(21) (Supp. 1996), as
added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
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actions, the finding of a violation is sufficient. Except for emergency cease and
desist orders,3" the secretary need not prove that the particular violation
damaged public health or the environment."
The Act requires the secretary to "establish policies and procedures to
address violations in a formal and consistent manner."32 To the extent that such
procedures have been formalized into rules, many are still found in the rules

issued by the Environmental Control Commission before it was abolished in
1984. 3 Although the secretary has recently superseded some of the commission rules, the unrepealed portions (which contain many outdated references)

remain in effect.'
The commission rules provide for public complaints about, and departmental
investigations of, possible violations. They allow any person to file a complaint

with the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality" and require the
secretary to determine, within fifteen days, if an investigation is warranted. 3'6 To
"develop facts," the secretary may use either "staff investigatory procedures" or

30. La. R.S. 30:2025(CXI) (Supp. 1996). For a discussion of emergency cease and desist
orders, see infra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d
31. Inre McGowan, 533 So. 2d 999, 1004 (La. App. Ist
1168 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 80 (1989); Office of Environmental Affairs v.
McWhorter &Assoc., Inc., 449 So. 2d 1062, 1067 (La. App. 1st Cir, 1984). But cf.State v. Union
Tank Car, 439 So. 2d 377, 383 (La. 1983) (no violation of Air Control Law occurs until emissions
reach "undesirable levels"); accordLouisiana Dept. of Env. Quality v. Pete Caldwell Drilling Co.,
Inc., 484 So. 2d 801 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ not considered, 489 So. 2d 240 (1986).
32. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(A) (Supp. 1996). Prior to 1995, La. RS. 30:2025 contained the duty
to address violations in a formal and consistent manner in accordance with uniform and consistent
procedures. La. R.S. 30:2025(A) (1989) prior to amendment by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
33. Although the Environmental Control Commission initially published its procedures rules
as emergency rules, 6 La. Reg. 159 (1980), it did not publish a verbatim copy ofthe permanent rules.
6 La. Reg. 514 (1980). Instead, it provided (and the Department of Environmental Quality continues
to provide) copies of the final rules on request. The quotations in the text come from the final rules.
34. The rules actually provide for enforcement actions to be initiated by the Assistant Secretary
for the Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of Natural Resources and appealed to the
Environmental Control Commission. The Office of Environmental Affairs became the Department
of Environmental Quality in 1983. See 1983 La. Acts No. 97. In 1984, the legislature abolished the
Environmental Control Commission and transferred the Commission's powers to the Secretary of the
Department of Environmental Quality. 1984 La. Acts No. 795, adding La. R.S. 30:2013 (1989). The
Secretary ofthe Department ofEnvironmental Quality has never completely updated the Commission
rules. New rules have been proposed on at least two occasions, and recently issued rules have
superseded some of the Commission rules. See La. Env. Reg. C., pt. I, §§ 301-73; 21 La. Reg. 555
(1994).
35. Environmental Control Comm'n Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.0. As explained insupra note
34, the Commission rules antedate the creation of the Department of Environmental Quality.
Although the rules provide for complaints to be filed with the Assistant Secretary of the Office of
Environmental Affairs in the Department of Natural Resources or the Environmental Control
Commission, the secretary has assumed the powers of both the assistant secretary and the
Commission. See supra note 34.
36. Environmental Control Commission Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.0.
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"formal investigatory proceedings."" Within seven days after an investigation is
completed, the person responsible for the investigation must present a report ofthe
investigation to the secretary, with a copy furnished to the attorney general "for use
in any civil or criminal proceedings under the Act."3
When the secretary determines that a violation is occurring, the rules direct that
"appropriate action" under the Act "shall" be commenced.39 When "enforcement
actions" are undertaken, the rules direct that the secretary is to conduct them "in
accordance with" the provisions of the Environmental Quality Act and that all
hearings for penalty assessments are to be adjudicatory.'
The Environmental Quality Act authorizes a range of enforcement options. A
single section, Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2025, covers most alternatives for
governmental enforcement," although other sections govern particular types of
violations.' 2 The general enforcement section allows the Department of
Environmental Quality to impose administrative sanctions, 43 to request the
attorney general to initiate a civil enforcement action," or to refer the matter to
a district attorney for criminal prosecution.' 5 A separate section, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:2026, allows any aggrieved person to file a citizen suit.
Furthermore, private remedies authorized by other provisions of law also remain
available to potential plaintiffs.
In addition to the powers described in the preceding paragraph, the secretary
also has emergency power to act immediately to protect the environment, regardless
of whether a preexisting rule has been violated. The secretary may direct the filing
ofcivil actions, take administrative action to abate the pollution, or order a response
from emergency response personnel." Because no violation is required to support
these initiatives, the administrative responses are not true enforcement actions. 7

37.

Id. at Rule 3.3.

38.

Id. at Rule 3.4.

39.

Id. at Rule 3.6.

40. Id. at Rule 3.7. The rules refer to La. R.S. 30:1073, but that section has been renumbered
as La. R.S. 30:2025. See La. R.S., Title 30, at p. 636 (Table 2).
41. Other environmental statutes that are administered by the Departments of Agriculture,
Nature Resources, or Public Safety assign administrative responsibilities for enforcement to the heads
of those agencies. See, e.g., La. R.S. 3:3209, 3226, 3252, 3278, 3372, 3373 (1987 and Supp. 1996);
30:4.1, 918 (1989 and Supp. 1996), 32:1512-15 (1989 and Supp. 1996); 49:214.36 (Supp. 1996).
42. See, e.g., La. R.S. 30:2076.1, 2076.2, 2183(G) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 366368 and accompanying text.
43. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)-(E) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 127-275 and accompanying
text.
44. La. R.S. 30:2025(B), (G)(1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 289-326 and accompanying text.
45. La. R.S. 30:2025(F) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 328-370 and accompanying text.
46. La. R.S. 30:2024(B), 2033 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 276-288 and
accompanying text.
47. Environmental Control Comm'n v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 450 So. 2d 1292, 1299
(La. 1984); Office of Environmental Affairs v. McWhorter & Assoc., Inc., 449 So. 2d 1062, 1069
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1984).
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Nonetheless, this Article discusses them because they give the secretary important
powers to prevent or to correct private actions that threaten to degrade the

environment.
The remaining analytical sections describe the methods available for the
department to detect violations of the Environmental Quality Act, the options for

enforcing the Act, and the emergency powers of the secretary. The final section
evaluates the adequacy of the enforcement alternatives that are currently available
under the statute.
II. DETECTION OF VIOLATIONS
A. Self-Reporting
To a significant degree, environmental enforcement relies on self-reporting by
those who violate environmental regulations. The Environmental Quality Act
requires that "[a]ny person who discharges, emits, or disposes of any substance in
contravention of any provision" of the Environmental Quality Act or any rule or
permit issued under the Act must report the violation "to the proper authorities."
The violator is to make the report "immediately, or in accordance with regulations
adopted" under the Act. The report is to describe the "nature and amount [of the
substance that is discharged] and the circumstances surrounding same." The format
of the report is to comply with "uniform reporting procedures" of the Department
of Environmental Quality and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
A proviso at the end of the reporting subsection prohibits requiring "additional
notifications or reports... for emergency releases except as specifically required
by law or rules as provided by this Section."4
The substantive laws that make up the Environmental Quality Act also impose

reporting requirements. The Air Control Law requires "a written report within
seven days" for "any discharge of a toxic air pollutant" that exceeds allowable
quantities. 9 The reporting requirement ofthe Water Control Law is even broader;

it applies to "[a]ny person who allows, suffers, permits, or causes the unpermitted
pollution of the waters ofthe state in contravention ofanyprovision" of the Water
Control Law or of rules, permits, or orders issued pursuant to the law.50 The
Nuclear Energy and Radiation Control Law mandates that "[aIll cases ofexposure
in excess of that permitted by regulations" must be "immediately reported" to the

48.

La. R.S. 30:2025(J) (Supp. 1996).

49. The report must contain "information on the source, nature, and cause of the discharge";
list "It]he date and time of the discharge"; indicate "(t]he approximate total loss during the
discharge"; explain "Ithe method used for determining the loss"; describe "[t]he action taken to
prevent the discharge"; identify "(tlhe measures adopted to prevent future discharges"; and include
other information that the Secretary deems necessary. La. R.S. 30:2060(H) (Supp. 1996).
50. La. K-S. 30:2077 (Supp. 1996); see also La. R.S. 30:2076(D) (1989). The water law does
not define the scope of the reports that it requires to be filed.
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Office of Air Quality and Nuclear Energy."1 The Hazardous Waste Control Law
provides that the "owner or operator" of an "active site" or facility must notify the
Office of Solid and Hazardous Waste "whenever the owner or operator... obtains
information indicating that hazardous waste is leaching, spilling,
discharging, or
' 2
otherwise moving in, into, within, or on any land or water."
Certain releases of hazardous substances require reports to the state police
rather than to the Department ofEnvironmental Quality. The Hazardous Materials
Information, Development, Preparedness, and Response Act requires "owners
and operators" to notify the Department of Public Safety and Corrections of any
release, "other than a federally or state permitted release or application of a
pesticide or fertilizer, of a hazardous substance listed pursuant to" the Act
whenever the release exceeds "the reportable quantity when that reportable quantity
has the potential to escape the site of the facility." Notice is to be-provided "as
soon as the owner or operator has knowledge of such release."' In addition, the
Hazardous Materials Transportation and Motor Carrier Safety law establishes
special requirements for accidents relating to the transportation of hazardous
materials. The duty to report extends to any person "involved in an incident,
accident, or the cleanup of an incident or accident during the transportation,
loading, unloading, or related storage in any place of a hazardous material." The
report must be filed "immediately by telephone" if the incident involves a "fatality"
or the "hospitalization of any person due to fire, explosion or exposure to any
hazardous material," any "continuing danger to life, health, or property at the place
of the incident or 'accident,"
or "lanestimated property damage of more than ten
S
thousand dollars."
A 1989 amendment to the Environmental Quality Act directed the Department
of Environmental Quality and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections
"jointly [to] establish a uniform reporting procedure" by January 1990.6
Although uniform regulations have not yet been issued, both departments have
issued rules governing reports that must be submitted.
The rules of the Department of Environmental Quality establish reporting
requirements that are mandated by both the general reporting requirements of the
Environmental Quality Act and the specific provisions of the laws governing air
and water pollution and hazardous waste." The rules have a four-fold purpose:
I) To protect the health and well-being of the people of the state of
Louisiana and to prevent and [to] mitigate damage to property or to the

51.
52.

La. K.S. 30:2107(B) (1989).
La. R.S. 30:21830) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see also La. R.S. 30:2204(A)(1) (1989 and

Supp. 1996). The law does not prescribe the content of the report; it merely requires that it be
submitted "in accordance with regulations to be adopted."
53. La. R.S. 30:2361-2379 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
54. La. R.S. 30:2373(B) (Supp. 1996).
55. La. R.S. 32:1510 (1989).
56. La. R.S. 30:2025(J) (Supp. 1996).
57. La. Envtl. Reg. C., part 1, § 3901 (Aug. 1993).
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environment due to unauthorized discharges ofpollutants to land, water,
or air.
2) To provide a uniform notification and reporting procedure for
unauthorized discharges.
3) To enable appropriate emergency response to unauthorized
discharge incidents.
4) To provide the department with the discharge information that
may be used to insure compliance with permit terms and conditions.
The rules mandate two types ofreporting. Unauthorized discharges that cause
"emergency conditions" must be reported "immediately.""8 Other unauthorized
discharges must be reported "promptly" when the amount discharged exceeds a
59
"reportable quantity."

The rules contain detailed procedures for making both

verbal and written reports.'
Rules that the secretary has issued pursuant to the substantive laws that make
up the Environmental Quality Act also include reporting mandates. These
mandates cover emissions of toxic air pollutants,6 discharges of hazardous
wastes,' and releases from underground storage tanks.' 3
The Department of Public Safety and Corrections has promulgated separate
rules governing reports that must be submitted under the Hazardous Materials
Information, Development, Preparedness, and Response Act, 4 which requires
reporting ofreleases ofdesignated hazardous substances as well as the development
of plans for responding to releases. The department's rules require immediate
reporting of releases of materials designated as hazardous by the federal Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Transportation, or the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration." When a reportable release occurs, the person
responsible must report it to the Hazardous Material hotline, operated by the
Louisiana Emergency Response Commission, and the local emergency planning

58.

An unauthorized discharge that causes "an emergency condition" requires notification of the

department "immediately (a reasonable period of time after taking prompt measures to determine the
nature, quantity, and potential off-site impact of a release, considering the exigency ofthe circumstances), but in no case later than one hour after learning of the discharge." It also requires a subsequent
written report. The regulation defines an "emergency" as any condition that "could reasonably be
expected to endanger the health and safety ofthe public, cause significant adverse impact to the land,
water, or air environment, or cause severe damage to property." Id. §§ 3915, 3925.
59. When the discharge does not create an emergency condition, the discharger must make
verbal contact with the appropriate office of the department within 24 hours followed by a written
report. Id. § 3917. Reporting is required only when the unauthorized discharge exceeds the
threshold limits identified in the rules. See id. A lengthy set of tables specifies what constitutes a
reportable quantity for a large number of substances. Id. § 3931.
60. Id. § 3925.
61. Id. at pt. 111,§ 5107(B).
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at pt. V, § 105(J).
Id. at pt. V, § 1913(D); pt. XI, §§ 509(A)(2), 707.
La. R.S. 30:2361-2379 (1989 and Supp. 1996).
La. Adm. C. 33:10111(A), (B).
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committee, as well as to "other agencies ... [who] may need to be notified."
Within five days, the person responsible for the discharge must submit a written
66
report to the state commission and the local emergency planning committee.
Failure to report a violation ofthe Environmental Quality Act is a violation of
the Act that is distinct from the substantive violation that triggers the obligation to
report.6

Under the Act, the secretary can assess an additional penalty for the

failure to report." Moreover, the duty to report is a continuing one, and each day
of noncompliance is a separate violation.69
Although no reported decisions have construed the reporting requirements of
the individual substantive laws that are part ofthe Environmental Quality Act, the
language of those requirements is similar to the wording of the general reporting
provisions of the Act. Like the general reporting provisions, the specific statutes
expressly declare that violation ofthe duty to report is a separate statutory violation
for which a civil penalty can be assessed, and they declare each day ofnoncompliance to be a separate violation."0
Mandatory reporting duties may raise self-incrimination problems when
violators are subject to criminal prosecution. Information a natural person is
required to provide cannot form the basis for conviction. Moreover, as discussed
below,7 the Louisiana courts have not yet determined whether the privilege also
applies to the civil penalties that the Act authorizes the secretary to impose.
B. DepartmentalInvestigations
The Environmental Quality Act grants broad investigatory powers to the
secretary. The section that delineates the general powers and duties ofthe secretary
expressly includes authority to conduct "inspections." 7 It also allows the
secretary to "hold meetings or hearings... for [the] purpose offactfinding... [or]
conducting inquiries and investigations." In connection with these meetings or
hearings, the secretary may issue "subpoenas" that require "the attendance of...
witnesses and the production of... documents."73 Finally, the section confers on
the secretary "all incidental powers necessary or proper to carry out the purposes
of' the Act.'

66.

Id. § 10111(D).

67.

In re McGowan, 533 So. 2d 999 (La. App. lstCir.), writdenied, 537 So. 2d 1168(1989), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989); In re Mullins & Pritchard. Inc., 549 So. 2d 872 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).

68.

La. R.S. 30:2025(J)(5) (Supp. 1996); see In re McGowan, 533 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 1st

Cir.). writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1168 (1988), cert.*denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989) (allowing penalties for
substantive violations as well as failure to report).

69.
70.
La. R.S.
71.
72.
73.
74.

La. R.S. 30:2025(J)(5) (Supp. 1996).
See La. R.S. 30:2060(H), 2077, 2107(B), 2183(I), 2373(A) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see also
32:1510(A) (1989) (Department of Public Safety.and Corrections).
See infra notes 266-272 and accompanying text.
La. R.S. 30:2011(DX13) (1989).
See also La. R.S. 30:2011(D)(5) (Supp. 1996).
La. R.S. 30:2011(DX14) (1989).
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Provisions in several other parts of the Environmental Quality Act
supplement the general grants of authority to the secretary. A 1995 amendment
to the general provisions of the Act grants the secretary discretion to hold "public
hearing[s] for the purpose of fact-finding or establishing policy."" The Air
Control Law provides that the Office of Air Quality and Radiation Protection
may "make investigations upon receipt of information concerning an alleged
violation" of the air law.76 The Nuclear Energy and Radiation Control Law
authorizes the same office to investigate violations of that statute," and the
Water Control Law contains a similar provision covering investigatory authority
of the Office of the Secretary for violations of the water statute.78 The only
general rules regarding investigations were issued by the Environmental Control
Commission in 1980,' but they apparently remain in effect because the
secretary has never repealed them.s The commission rules provide for
investigations in response to citizen complaints 1 and also authorize investigations "[u]pon the receipt of reasonable information" that a violation of the
Environmental Quality Act (or rules issued pursuant to the Act) has occurred. 2
The rules define the purpose of any investigation as "determining whether a
violation exists, the scope of the violation, and the persons or parties involved."' 3 In conducting the investigation, the secretary may use either "staff
investigatory procedures or ... formal investigatory proceedings."" After the
investigation is complete,"[a]ll facts concerning any alleged violation" must "be
fully documented in a report of investigation" that is to be presented to the secretary." If the secretary determines that a violation has occurred, the rules direct
that "appropriate enforcement proceedings" be instituted."'

75. La. R.S. 30:2016(A) (Supp. 1996). Prior to 1995, most of the details of § 2016 were
contained in La. R.S. 30:2181, which required that the Office of Solid and Hazardous Waste hold
"hearings for the purpose of factfinding, receiving public comments, or conducting inquiries and
investigations in connection with the processing of applications for permits or licenses for commercial
hazardous waste treatment. storage, or disposal facilities." La. R.S. 30:2181 (1989) (repealed by
1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 3).
76. La. R.S. 30:2054(AX2) (1989). The subsection further provides that the authorization to
make investigations "upon receipt of information concerning a violation" is not intended to "detract
from the power of the office to make investigations and inquiries upon its own motion."
77. La. R.S. 30:2104(AX2) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
78. La. R.S. 30:2074(A)(2) (1989).
79. 6 La. Reg. 514 (1980).
80.

See supra note 34.

81. Env. Control Comm'n Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.0.
82. Id. at Rule 3.1.
83. Id. at Rule 3.3.
84. Id. at Rule 3.2. This rule specifically authorizes the secretary to "hold non-adjudicatory,
fact.finding public hearings" and to "conduct ... inspections of facilities" in the course of
investigations.
85. Id. at Rule 3.4. A copy of the report is to be furnished to the Attorney General.
86. Id. at Rule 3.5.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

The rules implementing the substantive statutes in the Environmental Quality
Act generally grant investigatory authority to the secretary or the secretary's
designee with respect to violations of the particular environmental regulations
with which they are concerned. Thus; for example, air rules provide authority
to investigate violations of standards relating to air pollution,87 the water rules
grant investigatory authority over possible violations of the water law,88 and the
rules pertaining to solid and hazardous waste allow investigations of violations
89
of those controls on pollution.
The only judicial opinion to analyze the department's investigatory powers
in any detail emphasized the broad discretion that is conferred by the Environmental Quality Act. In re BASF, Inc.' involved a citizen group's challenge to
the compromise of a civil penalty that the department had imposed administratively. Although the first circuit ultimately remanded the penalty to the secretary
on other grounds," the appellate court construed the statutory and regulatory
framework to confer substantial discretion regarding the way departmental
investigations are conducted. Specifically, the court upheld the department's
authority to conduct settlement negotiations with an alleged violator without
complying with the procedural requirements applicable to "hearings." According
to the first circuit, the department's "authority to settle or [to] resolve any claim
informally" allowed it to hold "private meetings" with alleged violators. Because
those meetings were not "hearings" within the meaning of the Environmental
Control Commission rule, the department was not required to follow the
procedural rules applicable to hearings.'
C. Inspections
Unlike the inspection provisions of most federal statutes, 3 Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30:2012 expressly authorizes the Department of Environmental
87. La. Envtl. Reg. C.. pt. IIl, §§ 107, 111 (1994). The air rules limit investigations "upon
receipt of evidence concerning an alleged violation" to cases where the department has received a
"written complaint" of a violation. Id. § 107C.
88. Id. at pt. IX, § 503 (1993).
89. Id. at pt. V, § 107(B) (1994) (hazardous waste); pt. VII, §§ 903, 905 (1994) (solid waste);
pt. XI, § 1505 (1992) (underground storage tanks).
90. 538 So. 2d 635 (1st Cir. 1988), writ granted and denied, 539 So. 2d 624 and541 So. 2d
900 (La. 1989).
91. The court concluded that the secretary had erred by failing to submit the compromise to
the attorney general for concurrence, 538 So. 2d at 644; see infra notes 247-250 and accompanying
text, and that the secretary had failed to offer an adequate rationale to justify the penalty that was
imposed. 538 So. 2d at 645.
92. 538 So. 2d at 643. The court also held that neither the Environmental Quality Act nor the
commission rules granted "the public an absolute right to be heard concerning violations of the Act."
Although an interested party could request a public hearing, the department could, "in its own
discretion, . . . grant or deny the request." Id.

93. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (1994)
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7414(d) (1994) (Clean Air Act).
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Quality to inspect facilities without obtaining a warrant." However, the precise
reach of the provisions authorizing warrantless searches is unclear. Moreover,
a broad construction of the statutory authorization raises substantial constitutional
concerns.
Subsection A of Section 2012 begins with justifications for allowing
inspections. It declares that "the protection of the environment and public
health" requires that "all facilities subject to the provisions" ofthe Environmental
Quality Act be subject to "timely and meaningful inspections" and that
"inspections of such facilities are essential to assure compliance" with the Act.
It defines the "purpose of such inspections" as determining whether "[e]nvironmental standards have been achieved," an environmental "emergency" exists,
"[tihere is a present or potential danger to the health or environment," a violation
of the Act "has occurred," or "an abandoned waste site" exists.9"
The remaining subsections of Section 2012 address three sets of issues.
Subsections B-E define the nature of the inspections that Subsection A declares
to be necessary. Subsections F and G provide mechanisms for enforcing the
secretary's right to conduct warrantless inspections. Subsections H and I impose
certain conditions on how inspections are carried out.
Subsection B authorizes inspections of permitted facilities. It conditions
"[e]very permit" on "the right of the secretary or [a] representative to make an
annual monitoring inspection and, when appropriate, an exigent inspection of the
facility operating thereunder." 6
Subsection Cconfers inspection authority without reference to the existence
of a permit. It declares that "to assure effective enforcement" of the Act, the
department may conduct "the inspections" without obtaining a warrant."
Subsection D requires an annual "monitoring inspection" for "all facilities
operating with a permit issued pursuant to" the Environmental Quality Act. In
addition, it directs the secretary to prescribe "guidelines for additional monitoring
inspections" in light of "the type of activity to be monitored, the requirements
of the individual regulatory programs, the environmental history of a given
facility, and any other relevant environmental, health, or enforcement factors."

94. La. R.S. 30:2012(C) (Supp. 1996); see also La. R.S. 30:2002(3) (1989); cf. La. R.S.
30:917(B) (1989) (allowing the Commissioner of Conservation to make "irregular" inspections
"without prior notice" under the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act). Not all environmental
statutes contain similarly broad authority for warrantless searches. In particular, the inspection
powers of the Commissioner of Agriculture under the pesticide law are much more limited.
Normally, the Commissioner must obtain a judicial warrant before conducting searches. La. R.S.
3:3204(A) (1987). However, the chapters governing water protection and pesticide wastes allow the
Commissioner to "enter" properties "during working hours." La. R.S. 3:3275(B), 3307(B) (1987).
In addition, employees of the Structural Pest Control Commission shall have "access to any premises
where there is reason to belief structural pest control work is being conducted ... during reasonable
hours and... upon presentation of proper credentials." La. R.S. 3:3365 (1987).
95. La. R.S. 30:2012(A) (1989).
96. La. R.S. 30:2012(B) (1989).
97. La. R.S. 30:2012(C) (Supp. 1996).
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The guidelines must provide that inspections are to be conducted at "reasonable
times," and the secretary must give "[wjritten notice of the adoption of such
guidelines ... to each person subject to inspection." 8

Subsection E authorizes additional "special" inspections "[w]henever there
exists an imminent danger to the environment or health, an emergency under [the
Environmental Quality Act], an abandoned hazardous waste site, or a violation"
of the Act or rules adopted pursuant to the Act. In these special inspections, the
inspector must inform a "responsible person at the facility of the particular
exigent condition" that is believed to exist. Moreover, the 'scope of these
inspections is limited "to those matters which are reasonably related to the
exigent condition," but the department may nonetheless prosecute "any other
violation discovered in the course of the investigation."
Subsection F allows the secretary to obtain "a permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or any other appropriate order" to compel
inspections. The judge may enter an order, "ex parte or after a hearing," if the
department shows that the owner or operator of a facility has:
1) Interfered "with the secretary or [the secretary's] authorized
representative in carrying out the provisions" of the Environmental
Quality Act; or
2) Refused "to admit the secretary or [the secretary's] representative to a facility"; or
3) Refused "to furnish information requested by the secretary or

[the secretary's] representative"; or
4) Refused to allow "access to, or the copying of, such records as

the secretary or [the secretary's] representative determines are necessary
for the enforcement" of the Act or "to provide reasonable copies of
such records within a reasonable time."
In addition, the secretary may also obtain the appropriate order upon a showing
that the owner or operator is "about to" take any of the foregoing actions.'
Subsection G provides that anyone "who in any way impedes an inspection"
under Section 2012 is liable for "the penalties provided" by the Act unless the
court finds "that the inspection was unconstitutional." It also provides that, in
cases involving a refusal to provide copies of records, "the respondent" has the
burden of demonstrating "that the request to provide copies of records was
unreasonable.''.
Subsection H regulates the person who conducts the inspection. It requires
the inspector to present "identification" and, "to the extent practicable under the

98.
99.
100.
101.

La.
La.
La.
La.

R.S. 30:2012(D) (Supp. 1996).
R.S. 30:2012(E) (1989).
R.S. 30:2012(F) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
R.S. 30:2012(G) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
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circumstances," to comply with "safety, internal security, and fire protection"
rules of the facility being inspected.'O2
Subsection I mandates the department to furnish "the owner, operator, or
agent in charge" of the facility with a receipt for "any samples" that the inspector
has obtained. "[I]f requested and if practical," the department must also furnish
the person in charge of the facility "a portion of each sample equal in volume
or weight to the portion retained." If the department analyzes the samples it
takes, it must "promptly" furnish the owner,
operator, or agent in charge with "a
03
copy of the results of such analyses."'
The provisions of Section 2012 are ambiguous in several important respects.
The section fails to indicate exactly who is subject to the warrantless inspections
it authorizes, whether its requirements pertaining to "monitoring inspections" are
mandatory or directory, or whether a court order is a prerequisite to the
imposition of penalties for impeding an inspection.
First, the statute is unclear as to whether the right to conduct inspections is
limited to facilities that have obtained permits under the Environmental Quality
Act or whether the department may also inspect unpermitted facilities that it
believes have violated the Act. The justification for warrantless inspections in
Subsection A is not limited to permitted facilities; it declares that inspections are
required for all facilities "subject to the provisions" of the Act. In addition,
Subsection E allows "special inspections" whenever "a violation" of the Act
exists. However, Subsection B conditions the issuance of permits on the
department's right to conduct "an annual monitoring inspection," and Subsection
D provides for "monitoring inspections" of "facilities operating with a permit
issued pursuant to" the Environmental Quality Act.
Second, the section fails to prescribe sanctions for the secretary's failure to
conform to the minimal conditions it prescribes for "monitoring inspections."
The department is to inspect every permitted facility "annually," and the
secretary is to issue "guidelines" that provide for additional inspections.
Although the language of these requirements is mandatory,"° the section makes
no express provision as to the consequence of the secretary's failure to comply
with them. At least three possibilities exist. The requirements may be merely
directory, they may be mandatory obligations enforceable by mandamus, or they
may be indispensable so that the failure to satisfy them extinguishes the right to
conduct warrantless inspection.
Third, the statute does not explain the relationship between the sanctions that
Subsections G and H provide for impeding inspections. Do the two subsections
establish alternatives between which the secretary is free to choose, or does the

102. La. R.S. 30:2012(H) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
103. La. R.$. 30:2012(1) (1989).
104. La. R.S. 30:2012(D) (1989 and Supp. 1996) ("A monitoring inspection... shall be made
at least once annually. The secretary shall promulgate guidelines. . . .")(emphasis added).
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authority to impose penalties arise only after the secretary has obtained a judicial
order authorizing the inspection?"S
The constitutional concerns described below counsel a narrow construction
of the statute on all three points. The United States Supreme Court has limited
warrantless inspections to highly regulated industries, 6 although its most
recent opinions have defined the category broadly to include auto "chop
shops."'"7 Extending the department's power to inspect to include any person
who might be violating any portion ofthe Environmental Quality Act strains that
concept past the breaking point. A second prerequisite of a constitutional system
of warrantless inspections is a statutory scheme that provides certainty and
regularity regarding the timing and scope of inspections.'"6 Allowing the
department to ignore the minimal requirements of the Louisiana statute subjects
the person who is being inspected to the whim of the inspector or the inspector's
supervisors. Likewise, allowing the secretary to impose administrative penalties
in lieu of seeking a judicial order requiring compliance denies the person being
inspected an essential aspect of the traditional warrant requirement, review by an
impartial official before the search occurs."
Practical considerations also support a narrow construction of the statute.
The large number of permitted facilities and the need to discover unknown
violations may justify warrantless inspections of permitted facilities. Those
considerations, however, do not apply to persons operating without permits.
Allowing the department to inspect an unpermitted facility without evidence of
a violation would give environmental regulators virtually unlimited discretion.
Moreover, exclusion of unpermitted facilities would not seriously hamper
enforcement efforts because almost all important pollution sources now have

permits.

Similarly, interpreting the statutory requirements as mandatory

conditions for warrantless inspections would provide a strong incentive for the

department to conform to the legislative will. Finally, limiting the secretary's
power to impose penalties to violations of court-sanctioned inspections would
protect those being searched from arbitrary or unreasonable inspections without

compromising the secretary's authority to compel a recalcitrant permittee to
allow reasonable inspections.
The department has taken a broad view of its powers to conduct warrantless
inspections. It has not limited its inspections to permitted facilities, conditioned
them on its own compliance with the requirements of Section 2012, or delayed
the imposition of administrative penalties until a person has resisted a judicial

105.

This latter interpretation is the approach taken in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,

30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(1XC) (1994). See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534 (1981).
106.
107.

Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct, 2534 (1981).
New York v. Burger. 482 U.S. 691, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).

108.

See Burger, 482 U.S. at703, 107 S. Ct. at 2644; Donovan. 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S. Ct. at

2540.
109.

Donovan. 452 U.S. at 604.05. 101 S. Ct. at 2541.
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order." ° As a result of this generous construction of the secretary's powers,

the entire statutory scheme may violate the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 5of the Louisiana Constitution.
Since 1967, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that
"administrative searches" of commercial premises are subject to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment."' The Court has, however, crafted an
exception for "pervasively regulated" industries."'
To fall within the
pervasively regulated exception, an administrative inspection must satisfy three
criteria. A "substantial" governmental interest must "inform[] the statutory
scheme pursuant to which inspection is made,""' warrantless inspections must
be "necessary to further the regulatory scheme,""' and the statutory provisions
for warrantless inspections must provide "a constitutionally adequate substitute
for a warrant.'.
Certainly, some facilities with environmental permits could fall within the
pervasively regulated exception. Hazardous waste disposal facilities, sanitary
landfills, and major emitters of air pollution come immediately to mind.
However, extending the concept to any facility that obtains an environmental
permit goes too far. In Marshall v. Barlows, Inc.,"16 the United States Supreme Court refused to apply the exception to the general requirements of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The broad reach of the requirements of the Environmental Quality Act is more similar to the OSHA mandates
than to the industry-specific regulations involved in the Court's subsequent
decisions."1 7 Moreover, even if warrantless inspections of permitted facilities
are allowed, expanding the exception to unpermitted facilities stretches the

110. A 1988 memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs and Enforcement
outlined an aggressive interpretation of the department's authority to conduct warrantless inspections
under Section 2012. Memorandum from Liz Megginson, Assistant Secretary to All DEQ Staff (Dec.
13, 1988). Although several individuals have occupied the assistant secretary position since the
memorandum was issued, neither rescinded the memorandum, and it is apparently still used by
enforcement personnel in the department.
11. Marshall v. Barlows, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,98S. Ct. i816(1978); Seev. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 87 5. Ct. 1737 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727 (1967).
112. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 101 S.Ct. 2534 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S. Ct. 1593 (1972);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774 (1970).
113. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 107 S. Ct. at 2644; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602, 101 S.Ct. at
2540.
114. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 702, 107 S.Ct. at 2644; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600, 101 S. Ct.at
2539.
115. See Burger, 482 U.S. at 703, 107 S.Ct. at 2644; Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603, 101 S.Ct. at
2540.
116. 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816 (1978). For a recent decision analyzing an administrative
warrant for enforcing OSHA, see Tri-State Steel Construction, Inc. v. Occupational Safety &Health
Review Comm'n, 26 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
117. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452
U.S. 594, 101 S.CL 2534 (1981).
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concept beyond recognition. Ineffect, it extends the definition of "pervasively
regulated" to facilities that should be, but are not yet, extensively regulated.
Assuming the pervasively regulated exception is broad enough to apply to
all facilities covered by the Environmental Quality Act, the Louisiana statute may
not satisfy the other criteria established in the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Certainly, the environmental goals that the Environmental
Quality Act is designed to achieve" 's satisfy the requirement for a substantial
governmental interest. However, despite the legislative findings in the
Environmental Quality Act," 9 some doubt exists as to whether warrantless
inspections are "necessary to further the regulatory scheme." The Environmental
Protection Agency has determined that warrantless inspections are not necessary
to enforce the analogous federal statutes. 2
Unless the Louisiana statute is narrowly construed, it offers an inadequate
substitute for the traditional warrant requirement. Extending the authority to
cover unpermitted facilities eliminates any element of certainty or regularity
regarding the timing and scope of inspections, as does allowing the inspections
to continue despite the department's failure to conform to the statutory
conditions. Allowing the department to use administrative sanctions to force
acquiescence to inspections also denies the regulated community a traditional
protection against unreasonable searches, the interposition ofa neutral magistrate
before the search occurs.
In the only decision involving the inspection provisions ofthe Environmental
Quality Act, the first circuit upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless
inspection of an oil production facility.'' That decision may, however, not
provide the final word on the Louisiana statute for several reasons.
Most obviously, the decision of the state court of appeal is not binding on
either the Louisiana Supreme Court " ' or on federal courts in the state. That

See La. R.S. 30:2002 (1989) (in relevant part):
The legislature finds and declares that:
(1) The maintenance of a healthful and safe environment for the people of Louisiana is
a matter of critical state concern.
(2) It is necessary and desirable for the protection of the public welfare and property of
the people of Louisiana that there be maintained at all times, both now and in the future,
clean air and water resources, preservation of the scenic beauty and ecological regimen
of certain free flowing streams, and strictly enforced programs for the safe and sanitary
disposal ofsolid waste, for the management ofhazardous waste, for the control of hazards
due to natural and man-made radiation, considering sound policies regarding employment
and economic development in Louisiana.
119. La. R.S. 30:2002(3), 2012(A) (1989).
120. U.S. EPA, Basic Instructor Course: Fundamentals of Environmental Compliance Inspections
7-4 (1989).
121. In re Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
122. The Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception for administrative
searches, but it has not yet indicated how the exception applies in the environmental context. See
Pullin v. Louisiana State Racing Comm'n, 477 So. 2d 683 (La. 1985); see infra notes 125-126 and
accompanying text.
118.
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limitation is particularly important because some recent decisions in other states
and in lower federal courts have taken a narrower view of how the "pervasively
regulated" exception should apply to environmental statutes. 3 In 1990, for
example, the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that warrantless
searches under the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act violated the Fourth
Amendment.'
Even if the first circuit's approach is followed, its impact may be modest. The
court of appeals relied on the department's "reasonable belief' that "exigent
conditions" existed in the case before it. Thus, the holding may be inapplicable to
the more common "monitoring inspections" to which that requirement does not
apply.
In large measure, the importance of the search issue in Louisiana may turn on
the scope ofthe state's exclusionary rule. In Pullinv. LouisianaRacing CommisSion.S the Louisiana Supreme Court indicated that evidence seized in unconstitutional searches may have to be excluded from some administrative enforcement
proceedings as well as from criminal prosecutions. Although the Pullin opinion
refused to exclude evidence from a racetrack licensing proceeding, the court relied
on a balancing test to reach that result. Moreover, two of the factors that the Pullin
decision emphasized-that the officers who conducted the illegal search were state
police officers, not employees of the racing commission and that the "primary
duty" of the state police officers was "to enforce the criminal laws"- 6--do not
apply to inspections conducted pursuant to the Environmental Quality Act. Thus,
the court might exclude illegally obtained evidence in permit applications and
administrative proceedings to assess penalties.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE

SANCTIONS AND EMERGENCY POWERS

The Environmental Quality Act grants the Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality considerable administrative authority to enforce pollution
control standards and to respond when an emergency threatens human health or the
environment.' 7 As noted above, the department has a variety of administrative

123. E.g., V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming Dept. ofEnvironmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 920, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990); Flacke v. Onondaga Landfill Systems, Inc., 487
N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985); New Mexico Env. Improvement Div. v. Climax Chemical Co.,
733 P.2d 1322 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986). But see United States v. V-I Oil Co., 63 F.3d 909 (9th Cir.
1995) (warrantless inspections of a liquefied propane gas retailer under the Hazardous Material
Transporation Act do not violate the retailer's Fourth Amendment rights); Commonwealth Dept. of
Envtl. Resources v. Blosenski Disposal Service, 566 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1989) (allowing warrantless
inspection of solid waste transfer station).
124. V-I Oil Co. v. Wyoming Dept. of Environmental Quality, 902 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 920, 111 S. Ct. 295 (1990).
125. 484 So. 2d 105 (La. 1986).
126. Id. at 107.
127. Prior to the 1995 legislative session, the statutory language typically granted the
enforcement powers to "the commission, the secretary, or the assistant secretary" plus, in the case
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options. The secretary may issue emergency cease and desist orders for violations
that endanger public health or the environment. In addition, the secretary or
.subordinates in the department may choose between three basic administrative
options for responding to less critical violations of the Act: notices of violation,
compliance orders, or civil penalties. Finally, the secretary has emergency powers
to respond to threats to public health or the environment even when no violation has
occurred.
The choice of one administrative enforcement option does not preclude the
department from subsequently using another of the administrative or judicial
alternatives that are available.'
Indeed, the Environmental Quality Act
envisions that further enforcement action will be taken following a notice of
violation if the violator fails to stop the violation within thirty days.' 9 Furthermore, the Act doubles the maximum civil penalty when a person violates a
compliance order. 3 '
Selecting the appropriate enforcement action is a matter committed to the
secretary's discretion. 3' The secretary may begin with a notice of violation and
proceed to a compliance order or a penalty assessment only if the violation is not

of emergency cease and desist orders, to "an authorized technical secretary." See, e.g., La. R.S.
30:2025(C) (1989) (emergency cease and desist orders, notices of violation, and compliance orders),
2025(E) (1989) (civil penalties). As explained in supra note 34, Act 97 of 1983, which created the
Department of Environmental Quality, granted to the secretary of the new department the powers
previously exercised by the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources and the Assistant
Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of Natural Resources; and Act
795 of 1984, codified at La. R.S 30:2013, transferred the powers of the Environmental Control
Commission to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality.
The 1995 legislature passed two sets of law amending the enforcement section. Act 947 limits the
enforcement power to the secretary for emergency enforcement actions, see 1995 La. Acts No. 947,
§§ 1, 2 (adding La. R.S. 30:2050.8 and amending La. R.S. 30:2025(C); but allows the secretary or
assistant secretary to take other administrative enforcement actions. See id. (adding La. R.S.
30:2050.2, .3 and amending La. R.S. 30:2025(C), (E)). But see infra note 165 (discussing possible
constitutional challenge to Act 947). Act 1160 continues the prior statutory language regarding
authority to impose administrative sanctions. See 1995 La. Acts No. 1160, § I (amending La. R.S.
30:2025(C)). Because the purpose of Act 1160 was to allow departmental lawyers to represent the
department in judicial proceedings when the attorney general was unable or unwilling to do so, the
courts are likely to treat the language of Act 947 as controlling on the question of authority to take
administrative enforcement action. In any event, the Environmental Quality Act gives the secretary
broad authority to assign powers to an assistant secretary. La. R.S 30:2011(G) (1989).
128. For judicial decisions recognizing the discretion of the federal Environmental Protection
Agency to select any of the enforcement options available under the federal Clean Water Act, see
United States v. B & W Inv. Properties, 38 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1998
(1995) (civil enforcement action); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074, 100 S. Ct. 1020 (1980) (criminal penalties); United States v. City of
Colorado Springs, 455 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Colo. 1978) (civil enforcement action).
129. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)(2) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
130. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(2) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
131. Cf Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985) (administrative enforcement
decisions are not normally subject to review under the federal Administrative Procedure Act because
they are "committed to agency discretion by law").
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corrected, but the department need not follow such a sequential approach. If the
assessment, the secretary can issue
situation warrants a compliance order orpenalty
132
either as the initial administrative sanction.
The Environmental Quality Actdoes contain one provision that might arguably
serve to limit the department's investigatory authority. It mandates that the
secretary"establish policies andprocedure to address violations... in a formal and
consistent manner.' ' 33 No court has, however, relied on the absence of uniform
and consistent procedures as a ground for invalidating an enforcement action."'
A. Emergency Cease and Desist Orders
The secretary may issue an emergency cease and desist order for any violation
that threatens public health or the environment. An emergency order has a limited
duration, however. According to the statute, "[an] emergency order expires in
fifteen days."' 1" To continue the order for more than fifteen days, the secretary
must initiate an action for civil enforcement, or perhaps, issue an ordinary
compliance order.
Two criteria must be satisfied before the secretary can issue an emergency
cease and desist order. Because an emergency cease and desist order is an
enforcement action, the secretary can issue one only upon a determination "that a
violation (ofthe Environmental Quality Act] is occurring or is about to occur." But
the mere existence of a violation is not sufficient to authorize an emergency order.
The violation must be one ' "which
is endangering or causing damage to public
36
health or the environment.'
132. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)(3), 2025(E) (1989 and Supp. 1996); Office ofEnvironmental Affairs v.
McWhorter &Assoc., Inc., 449 So. 2d 1062,1069 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984); cf United States v. B & W
Inv.Properties, 38 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.denied,115 S.Ct. 1998 (1995) (under Federal Clean
Air Act. the EPA need not give notice to a violator ofhazardous airpollutant standards before beginning
judicialenforcement action); United States v. Frezzo Brothers, Inc., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (under Federal Clean Water Act, the EPA need not first pursue
administrative sanctions before proceeding to criminal enforcement). A 1995 amendment to the
Louisiana Environmental Quality Act requires the secretary to issue a notice ofviolation ten days before
levying a penalty assessment. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(B) (1989), as addedby 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § I.
133. La. R.S. 30:2050.1(A) (Supp. 1996); see supra note 32.
134. Cf 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1,adding La. R.S. 30:2050.3(A) (Supp. 1996) (if criteria for
assessment of penalties have not been established, "the secretary or assistant secretary shall exercise
discretion in applying the factors enumerated in this (Act] on the bases of available information").
135. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(D) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947. Prior to the 1995
amendment, the statute provided that "in no event shall such an emergency order remain in force
longer than fifteen days." La. R.S. 30:2025(CXI) (1989); In re Rollins Environmental Services, Inc.,
481 So. 2d 113, 115 n.7 (La. 1985). The change in statutory language may be significant. In Rollins
Environmental Services, the first circuit vacated an emergency order more than seventy days after
it was issued. The emergency order had apparently been extended beyond the fifteen-day period
without objection from the respondent.
136. La. R.S. 30:2025(CXI) (Supp. 1996). Effective January 1, 1996, 1995 La. Acts No. 947,
§ 2 amends and reenacts this subsection without substantive change. See also Id.§ 1.adding La.
R.S. 30:2050.$(A).
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The Environmental Quality Act provides little guidance as to the procedures
for issuing an emergency cease and desist order. The order must "[d]escribe with
specificity" the activity that is endangering or damaging the environment,
"[i]dentify the specific threat to public health or the environment that the activity
presents," and "[s]pecify the measures that the owner or operator of the facility or
site is directed to undertake immediately.""' An emergency order is effective
when it is signed, and "the respondent" must "comply with the order immediately
upon receiving knowledge ofthe order."''
The Environmental Quality Act expressly provides that an emergency order"is
not subject to administrative review," but it allows "[a]n action for injunctive relief
against an emergency cease and desist order" to be brought in the district court for
East Baton Rouge Parish; the plaintiff need not exhaust "administrative remedies"
as "a prerequisite to judicial review."'3 9 However, to prevail in the action against
the emergency order, the party challenging the order must demonstrate, "by clear
and convincing evidence, that the activity specified in the emergency order is not
endangering or causing damage to public health or the environment.""
The only administrative procedures governing emergency cease and desist
orders are found in the portions of the Environmental Control Commission rules
that have never been repealed."' The rules require that all orders, including
emergency cease and desist orders, be issued in writing and that they be served
on
2
the violator by hand delivery or by certified mail, return receipt requested. "1
The major restraint that the statute places on an emergency cease and desist
order is its limited duration. As noted above, an order "expires in fifteen
days.""' 3 However, nothing precludes the secretary from issuing the substance
of the emergency order as an ordinary compliance order, and the Act expressly
authorizes the secretary to file an action in district court for injunctive relief "at the
expiration of the emergency cease and desist order." In the action for injunctive
relief, the secretary bears the burden ofproving that "a violation is occurring or is

137. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(B)(Supp. 1996), as addedby 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1. Priorto the
1995 amendment (which became effective on January 1, 1996), the Act provided that the threat to
the environment determined the scope of the emergency order. As the name implies, the emergency
cease and desist order normally directed a "cessation of operations." The order could, however, also
impose "affirmative obligations" if cessation alone "would not completely abate the damages to the
environment." Those affirmative obligations could require the violator "to take whatever steps [were]
deemed necessary to abate the damage to the environment." Id. Act 1160 of 1995 reenacted this
prior language without the changes found in Act 947. As explained above, see supra note 127, the
court is likely to give effect to Act 947 because Act 1160 was concerned with representation of the
department in court rather than administrative enforcement.
138. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(C) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § I.
139. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(FX1) (Supp. 1996).
140. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(F)(2) (Supp. 1996).
141. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 4 directs the secretary to "propose all rules relating to
enforcement by January 1, 1997, and... (to] adopt those rules relating to enforcement by July 1,
1997."
142. Environmental Control Comm'n Rules of Procedures, Rules 1.3, 3.6.
143. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(D) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
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about to occur and that the violation is endangering or causing damage to public
health or the environment." Although the secretary need not post security, "[aIll
other provisions of law relative to injunctive relief apply."'"
B. Notices of Violation
In federal environmental statutes, notices ofviolation normally serve a special
purpose. They provide a means for federal oversight ofprograms in which primary
enforcement authority has been delegated to the state. In essence, they offer a
mechanism for the EPA to advise the state and the violator that it is aware that a
violation has occurred and that the federal agency expects the state to initiate an
appropriate enforcement action. ""
The notice of violation under Louisiana law is different. It provides formal
notification to the violator that the department has determined that a violation ofthe
Act has occurred and that the department will take further action if the violation is
not corrected within thirty days. Nonetheless, a state notice of violation, like a
federal notice, has no coercive impact on the alleged violator. The notice is merely
a formal declaration that the department believes the statute has been violated.
Because a notice of violation neither forces an alleged violator to do anything nor
mandates any payment from the alleged violator, neither the Environmental Quality
Act nor the Environmental Control Commission Rules place significant controls on
its issuance.
Substantively, the Environmental Quality Act imposes a few conditions for the
issuance ofa notice ofviolation. First, the notice must be preceded by a determination that a violation of a requirement of the Act "has occurred or is about to
occur.'" Although the substantive authority to issue a notice of violation is
phrased in the passive voice, the procedural amendments adopted in 1995 indicate
that the secretary or an assistant secretary may issue a notice of violation or
compliance order "within ten days after completion of the investigation of the
violation."""
Whether lower level employees of the department may issue notices of
violation depends on how the courts choose to characterize them. The 1995

144. La. R.S. 30:20S0.S(E) (Supp. 1996).
145. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1994) (violations in a state with an approved program for
issuing discharge permits under the Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1994) (violation in a
state with an approved hazardous waste program); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1994) (violations of a state
implementation plan under the Clean Air Act).
146. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)(2) (Supp. 1996); see also La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A) (Supp. 1996). La.
R.S. 30:2076.1 allows the secretary to issue a notice of violation to the owner or operator of a
treatment works if a person introduces pollutants into the works in violation of the Louisiana
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. However, the provisions of Section 2076.1 only become
effective if Louisiana receives authority to issue permits under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act.
See La. IKS. 30:2073.1 (Supp. 1996).
147. See La. KS. 30:2050.2(A), 2050.25(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947,
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amendments to the Act preclude assistant secretaries from delegating duties that
"require the exercise of deliberative discretion."'48 Because the Act provides
additional protections before the department imposes any coercive sanctions, this
prohibition should not extend to notices of violation.
The procedural requirements applicable to the issuance ofnotices ofviolation,
are minimal. A notice must describe the violation "with reasonable specificity,"
and the respondent must be notified that the notice of violation has been issued. 49
The department may either serve the notice personally or send the notice by
certified mail, return receipt requested."0 Despite the provision regarding notice,
the Act does not mandate that the department provide any mechanism for the
person who receives the notice to challenge the determination that a violation has
occurred or is about to occur.15'
The Environmental Control Commission Rules add little to the statutory
provisions. They require that all enforcement actions, including notices of
violation, be issued in writing, but that requirement is probably implicit in the
statute. The rules also follow the statute by allowing service by hand delivery or
by certified mail, return receipt requested.' s2 Like the Environmental Quality
Act, the rules refrain from mandating hearings or other proceedings for contesting
notices of violation.
If a violation continues for more than thirty days after a notice of violation has
been issued, the statute provides that the secretary "shall" issue a compliance order
or initiate a civil enforcement action. Whether this language establishes ajudicially
enforceable duty is unclear, but the preferable construction of the statute would
recognize the secretary's discretion to decide which type of enforcement action
should be undertaken.
Some federal precedents support the argument that the mandatory language of
the Environmental Quality Act creates a judicially enforceable duty to take further
enforcement action when the violation continues for more than thirty days after the
violator has been notified. Generally, an administrative decision not to initiate an
enforcement action is unreviewable. However, the United States Supreme Court
has held that mandatory language in an enforcement statute can overcome this
presumption. 53
'
For several reasons, Louisiana's appellate courts are likely to be reluctant to
find that the language of the Environmental Quality Act imposes a judicially

148. La. R.S. 30:2050.26 (Supp, 1996). For constitutional questions regarding the 1995
Amendments, see infra note 165.
149. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
150. La. R.S. 30:2050.23(A) (Supp. 1996).
151. The 1995 Amendments to the Environmental Quality Act define the "respondent" as "the
person against whom an enforcement action is directed." La. R.S. 30:2004(20) (Supp. 1996), as
added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
152. Environmental Control Comm'n Rules of Procedure, Rules 1.3, 3,6.
153. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 95 S.Ct. 1851 (1975). More recently, the Supreme
Court has reemphasized the normal presumption that decisions not to initiate enforcement action are
not reviewable. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (1985).
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enforceable, nondiscretionary duty to initiate an enforcement action. First, if the
statutory duty exists, it depends on a threshold factual finding of a continuing
violation; that finding is probably discretionary because the secretary has no duty
to assemble any particular administrative record on possible violations. Second, the
subsection of the enforcement section that follows the provision for notices of
violation uses similar mandatory language forthe issuance ofcompliance orders for
violations even when the secretary has not issued a notice of violation." 4
Obviously, the secretary cannot have mandatory duties to take both actions; at
most, the duty is to take some form ofenforcement action with the precise form left
to the secretary's discretion. Third, the Environmental Quality Act provides
another enforcement alternative where the secretary fails to take appropriate
enforcement action when a violation continues after notice has been given to the
violator. The citizen suit provision allows any person adversely affected by a
violation to bring a civil action directly against the violator.' 3 Because initiation
of a civil enforcement action is one of the remedies within the secretary's
discretion, initiation ofthe citizen suit allows the plaintiff to achieve the goal ofthe
enforcement mandate without the necessity forjudicial review ofthe department's
enforcement decision. Fourth, Louisiana's courts are likely to follow the
precedents of lower federal courts. These lower federal courts have generally
declined to construe federal environmental statutes as imposing mandatory
enforcement duties, even when the statutes prescribe that the Administrator ofthe
Environmental Protection Agency "shall" respond to violations. 6
A 1995 amendment to the Act requires that the department send a notice of
violation before it assesses a civil penalty administratively. The notice must
describe the violation "with reasonable specificity," and it must also "advise the
respondent that the assessment ofa penalty is under consideration"; following the
issuances of the notice, interested persons may file "written comments ...
regarding the alleged violation and a possible penalty.""'
C. Compliance Orders

Compliance orders issued by the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality differ significantly from the federal orders that the EPA is authorized to
154. La. R.S. 30:2025(CX3) (Supp. 1996).
155. La. R.S. 30:2026 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see infra notes 372-391 and accompanying text.
156. E.g., Sierra Club v. Train, 557 F.2d 485 (5th Cit. 1977); Caldwell v. Gurley Refining Co.,
533 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Ark. 1982); but see Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (civil penalties are mandatory for violations of the Clean Water
Act).

For a critical analysis of the failure of federal law to constrain the EPA's enforcement

discretion, see William L. Andreen Enforcement Discretion and the US Environmental Protection
Agency: Use, Abuse and Control, Australian Inst. Adm. L. Newsletter I (No. 6, 1991); William L.
Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescriptionfor Vigorous Federal
Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 George Wash. U. L. Rev. 202 (1987).
157. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1; see also infra
notes 238-242 and accompanying text.
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issue under the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act." 8 Federal compliance
orders under the air and water statutes advise the persons to whom they are
addressed of the steps the EPA believes are necessary to comply with statutory or
regulatory requirements, but the order is not a final agency action. As a result, the
alleged violator can defend a subsequent administrative or judicial enforcement
action on the ground that no violation occurred.' 9
By contrast, compliance orders issued by the Department of Environmental
Quality amount to an authoritative administrative determination that a violation has
occurred.'" Moreover, that administrative determination has at least two
practical consequences: it doubles the amount of the civil penalty that can be
imposed for a future violation, 6 ' and it allows the state to file a civil enforcement
action where "[tlhe hearing shall be limited to the issue of whether or not
compliance has taken place."' 6
The Environmental Quality Act provides somewhat more specificity with
regard to the content ofcompliance orders than it provides for notices ofviolations.
As with other administrative sanctions, the basic prerequisite is a determination
"that a violation of any requirement of (the Environmental Quality Act] has
occurred or is about to occur."' 63 Moreover, the Act also prescribes that every
compliance order must describe, "with reasonable specificity," the "nature of the
violation," establish "a time limit for achieving compliance," "[n]otify the
respondent of the right to an adjudicatory hearing," and "[a]dvise the respondent
that a civil penalty may be assessed for a violation.'",
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act established
procedures for issuing and appealing compliance orders.' 65 The statute now
158. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(3) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413(a)(1). (3) (1994)
(Clean Air Act); but cf 42 U.S.C. § 6934 (1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
159. Numerous courts have ruled that federal compliance orders issued under the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act are not subject to judicial review because they are not final agency actions.
E.g., Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564, 565 (10th Cir. 1995) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771
(1996); Southern Pines Assoc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (Clean Water Act);
Asbestec Construction Services, Inc. v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 766 (2d Cir. 1988) (Clean Air Act);
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (Clean Air Act). For a critical
assessment of the refusal to allow judicial review of federal compliance orders, see Andrew I. Davis,
Comment, Judicial Review of Environmental Compliance Orders, 24 Envtl. L. 189 (1993).
160. According to the 1995 Amendments to the Environmental Quality Act, a "compliance
order" is "an order issued by the secretary or an assistant secretary requiring a respondent to comply
with specified provisions of [the Environmental Quality Act], a rule, or a permit within a specified
period of time." La. R.S. 30:2004(19) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
161. See La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(2) (Supp. 1996); cf.42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (Supp. 1995) (allowing
a $25,000 civil penalty to be imposed for violation of compliance order issued under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act).
162. La. R.S. 30:2025(GX2) (Supp. 1996). Collection actions are described in more detail in
the text accompanying infra notes 306-311.
163. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)(3) (Supp. 1996).
164. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1. Prior to the
1995 Amendments, La. R.S. 30:2025(D) (1989) contained similar (but not identical) requirements.
165. 1995 La. Acts Nos. 739, 947, 1208. In addition, Act 947 directs the secretary to "propose
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allows the secretary or an assistant secretary to issue compliance orders'" and
obligates the person issuing the order to notify the respondent by personal service
or by certified mail, return receipt requested. 167 It also allows the respondent
or any other "aggrieved party" to request an adjudicatory hearing on a
compliance order.'"
A respondent who submits a written request to the
secretary has a "right to an adjudicatory hearing" on any "disputed issue of
material fact or of law arising from a compliance order."' 69 If any other

all rules relating to enforcement by January 1, 1997, and ... [to]
adopt those rules relating to
enforcement by July I. 1997." 1995 La. Acts No. 947, §4. Constitutional concerns have been raised
with respect to two of the 1995 laws.
The first circuit held Act 1208 unconstitutional on the ground that the body of the bill that became
Act 1208 was broader than its title and that the bill contained more than one object. In re Rubicon,
670 So. 2d 475 (La. App. IstCir. 1996); see La. Const. art. III, § 15(A). The court also held that
its holding regarding Act 1208 rendered ineffective Section 8 of Act 947, which adopted the appeal
provisions of Act 1208 by reference. Rubicon, 670 So. 2d at 481. The legislature, however, mooted
this last holding by readopting the appeal provision in the 1996 special session. See 1996 La. Acts
No. 41 (1stExtraordinary Session).
Act 947 raises a different constitutional question. The original copies of the Act distributed by the
Secretary of State and containing the governor's signature differ from the published version.
Compare 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § I (copy distributed by the Secretary of State and on file with the
author) with the printed act in West's Session Law Service and the printed version currently available
from the legislature. A check of the Act's legislative history illustrates the difference; the Senate
floor amendments listed in the House and Senate Journals are not the same. Compare page 5 of the
Senate Journal for June 19, 1995 with page 49 of the House Journal for the same day. This
discrepancy suggests that the Senate and House may not have passed identical legislation before
submitting it to the governor for signature.
166. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(A), 2050.25(B) (Supp. 1996). In the Environmental Quality Act, the
term "assistant secretary" refers to "the assistant secretary to whom a given function or responsibility
has been allocated by (the Act] or delegated by the secretary." La. R.S. 30:2004(18) (Supp. 1996),
as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
167. Environmental Control Comm'n, Rules of Procedure 1.3, 3.6.
168. The Act defines an "aggrieved person" as "a natural or judicial person who has a real and
actual interest that is or may be adversely affected by a final action .... La. R.S. 30:2004(17)
(Supp. 1996). as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
169. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(A), (B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1. If the
request for an adjudicatory hearing raises only issues of law, "the secretary may limit the parties to
the presentation of oral or written arguments." If the request raises only a factual issue, "the scope
of the hearing may be limited to the disputed issue of material fact." La. R.S. 30:2050.4(C) (Supp.
1996).
Prior to the 1995 amendments, no specific language in the statute or rules unambiguously required
the Department of Environmental Quality to grant a hearing to contest a compliance order. Although
Rule 5.0 of the Environmental Quality Rules stated that adjudicatory hearings are required for "all
enforcement proceedings," that language was arguably limited by the qualifying clause "as
contemplated by the Administrative Procedure[] Act," especially since the first circuit had held that
the explicit mandate for adjudicatory hearings when civil penalties are assessed does not require a
hearing when the person against whom the penalty is assessed agrees to waive the hearing. In re
BASF Corp. Chemical Division, 538 So. 2d 635, 642-43 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 541
So. 2d 900 (1989). If the Secretary failed to grant an adjudicatory hearing with respect to "(a]ny
enforcement... action," the Environmental Quality Act allowed the alleged violator to petition for
de novo review in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. Because the section that contained the
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aggrieved party requests a hearing, "[tihe secretary may grant the request when
equity and justice require it."' 70
A request for an adjudicatory hearing must be filed within thirty days
following the date the respondent is notified of the compliance order.'' If no
request is filed within thirty days, "[t]he compliance order becomes a final
enforcement action."'" If a request for a hearing is filed, the secretary must
act on the request within thirty days; if the secretary fails to grant a hearing
within thirty days, "the applicant" is entitled to file for "de novo review of the
secretary's action" in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.""'
The 1995 legislature enacted conflicting provisions concerning the handling
of a compliance order following an adjudicatory hearing. Act 947, which became
effective on January 1, 1996, provides that the secretary "issues the final
enforcement action after an adjudicatory hearing," unless the secretary delegates
the authority to the hearing officer. 7' Act 739, which creates an independent
division of administrative law in the Department of Civil Service, transferred
responsibility for all "adjudications"' 75 to the division effective October 1, 1996.
After that date, the "administrative law judge shall issue the final decision or order,
whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no authority to override such
decision or order." 76 Recognizing that the two acts were being considered
provided that the
simultaneously in the legislative process, the legislature expressly
7
provisions ofAct 739 would control in the case of a conflict.'
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act clarify the right ofthe
public to participate when adjudicatory hearings are held with respect to a
compliance order. Any "aggrieved person"'78 may intervene as a party in the

Secretary's authority to issue compliance orders was entitled "Enforcement," La. R.S. 30:2025 (1989
and Supp. 1996), the section providing for de novo review appeared to apply when the Secretary
refused to grant an adjudicatory hearing on a compliance order. La. R.S. 30:2024(A) (1989), prior
to amendment by 1995 La. Acts No. 947. § 2. In any event, the secretary repealed Rule 5.0 in June
1995. See 21 La. Reg. 556 (1995) (adding La. Env. Code, pt. I, § 305).
As a practical matter, the provision for de novo review always inclined the secretary to grant a
respondent's request for an adjudicatory hearing. If the secretary granted the hearing, the secretary's
decision was entitled to the presumption of correctness normally afforded administrative decisions.
If the hearing was denied, the attorney general had to convince the district court of the correctness
of the secretary's position.
170. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
171. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(E) (Supp. 1996).
172. La. R.S. 30:2050.2(C) (Supp. 1996).
173. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(G) (Supp. 1996).
174. La. R.S. 30:2050.5(A) (Supp. 1996).
175. An "adjudication" includes "formal or informal proceedings for the formulation of a
decision or order." La. R.S. 30:2004(16) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
176. La. R.S. 49:992(A), (B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § I.
177. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8.
178. An "aggrieved person" is "anatural or juridical person who has a real and actual interest
that is or may be adversely affected by a final action under this [Act)." La. R.S. 30:2004(17) (Supp.
1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
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hearing so long as "the intervention is unlikely to unduly broaden the issues or to
unduly impede the resolution of the matter under consideration."' 7 9 In addition,
prior to the adjudicatory hearing, interested parties may file "written public
comments" with the assistant secretary. "oMoreover, the secretary may, but need
not, hold "a public hearing.., in conjunction with an adjudicatory hearing."''
Once a compliance order is final, any aggrieved person may file a devolutive
appeal.'" Prior to 1995, appeals went directly to the first circuit.'
The
Supreme Court had ruled that this procedure was constitutional."' However,
Acts 947 and 1208 of 1995 changed the venue for appeals to the Nineteenth
Judicial District Court.8 " The first circuit ruled that this change was ineffective
because Act 1208 was unconstitutional,' 8 but the legislature re-established venue
in the district court in the 1996 special session.8 7
The Environmental Quality Act uses the verb "shall" to authorize the
department to issue compliance orders. Obviously, this language suggests the
argument that the department has a nondiscretionary duty to initiate enforcement
actions when violations occur. However, as noted previously with respect to the
similar language pertaining to violations of notices of violation,' the courts are
likely to find the authorization discretionary rather than mandatory.8 9
The first circuit has held that the secretary has broad authority to compromise
compliance orders. Prior to the enactment ofAct 947 of 1995, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:2025H required the secretary to obtain the concurrence ofthe attorney
general before settling "suits, disputes, or claims for any penalty," and a 1988
opinion ofthe first circuit held that the attorney general's compliance was required
before the secretary could compromise a civil penalty that had been imposed
administratively.' 90 Nonetheless, the court of appeal subsequently ruled that
concurrence was not required when the secretary is compromising a compliance
order that does not include a penalty.'9 ' According to the latter decision, "the 'for

179. La,R.S. 30:2050.11(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
180. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(1) (Supp. 1996).
181. La. R.S. 30:2050.12(A) (Supp. 1996). If a public hearing is held in conjunction with an
adjudicatory hearing, the public hearing "shall precede" the adjudicatory hearing. La. R.S.
30:2050.11(D) (Supp. 1996).
182. La R.S. 30:2050.21 (Supp. 1996).
183. La. R.S. 30:2024(C) (1989). prior to amendment by 1995 La. Acts No.947, § 2.
184. In re American Waste & Pollution Control Co., 588 So. 2d 367, 373 (La. 1991).
185. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8; No. 1208, § 2. For constitutional concerns regarding Acts 947
and 1208, see supra note 165.
186. In re Rubicon, Inc., 670 So. 2d 475, 479 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1996); accord In re E.I duPont
de Nemours & Co., 674 So. 2d 1007 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1996).
187. 1996 La. Acts No. 41, § 1 (1st Extraordinary Session); see In re Angus Chemical Co., No.
94-1148, 1996 WL 392660 (La. App. ist
Cir. 6/26/96) (upholding constitutionality of Act 41).
188. La. R.S. 30:2025(CX2) (Supp. 1996).
189. See supra notes 153-157 and accompanying text.
190. In re BASF Corp., Chem. Div., 538 So. 2d 635, 644 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1988), writ granted
on other grounds, 539 So. 2d 624, writ denied, 541 So. 2d 900 (1989).
191. In re Recovery I,Inc., 635 So. 2d 690, 698 (1st Cir.), writdenied, 639 So. 2d 1169 (1994).
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any penalty' clause" of Section 2025H modifies "disputes" as well as "claims"; to
hold otherwise would, the court declared, hinder "the vested authority of the
[secretary] as the trustee ofthe environment and render the 'for any penalty' clause
to be nothing more than meaningless or superfluous language."92
Although the legislature repealed Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2025H in
1995,193 the first circuit's holding remains a correct statement of current law.
The legislature reenacted the language of Section 2025H in a new section.
Moreover, the 1995 legislation added a new sentence that expressly excludes
lawsuits involving compliance orders from the normal requirement for obtaining
the attorney general's concurrence." 9
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act give the secretary
authority to prescribe rules establishing "informal procedures" for issuing
compliance orders, but the informal procedures may only be used with the
consent of the respondent.' s Although a compliance order issued after
informal procedures is "a final enforcement action," ' 96 the informal procedures
are not subject to the normal rules regarding adjudications or adjudicatory
hearings.'97 The rules establishing the informal procedures must identify the
compliance orders to which they apply,' and they must also require documentary evidence "to establish that a violation occurred," notify the respondent "of
the evidence relied upon to establish the violation," offer the respondent an
opportunity "to present... evidence in opposition to the order," give members
of the public an opportunity "to file written comments ... and to attend the
informal hearing if one is held, and list the final action on the "public list" of
enforcement actions.'"
D. Civil Penalties
Administrative assessment of civil penalties against violators has been far
more common under the Environmental Quality Act than under most federal
environmental statutes. Under both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act,
for example, federal law caps the maximum civil penalty that can be imposed
administratively and establishes a two-tiered hearing procedure that varies with
the severity of the penalty."°

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

635 So. 2d at 698-99.
1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 3.
La. R.S. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(D) (Supp. 1996).
La. &.S. 30:2050.6(C) (Supp. 1996).
La. RLS. 30:250.6(A) (Supp. 1996).

198.
199. La. ILS. 30:2050.6(B) (Supp. 1996).
200. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (Supp. 1996) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1994)
(Clean Air Act).
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The state system has most closely approximated the Resources Conservation
and Recovery Act provision governing violations of hazardous waste regulation.
That federal statute permits administrative imposition of penalties without a cap
and without any provision for procedures beyond the opportunity of the
respondent to request a "public hearing.""' The EPA has, however, established an elaborate system of administrative hearings and appeals for civil
penalties under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 2
The future of administratively imposed penalties is uncertain in Louisiana.
In 1995, the legislature amended the Environmental Quality Act in ways that
may prompt the secretary to rethink current policies regarding administrative
assessment of civil penalties. At least two changes make administrative
assessment less attractive. Now that penalties may be appealed to the Nineteenth
Judicial District Court rather than to the first circuit,0 3 administrative penalties
will be subject to review in four forums (administrative hearing, district court,
court of appeals, and supreme court); by contrast, judicially imposed penalties
will be reviewed in only three forums (district court, court of appeals, and
supreme court). Even more important, the administrative law judge, rather than
the secretary, makes the final administrative decision as of October 1, 1996. 20,
As with other enforcement actions, the prerequisite for the administrative
imposition of a civil penalty under the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act20is
a violation of the Act or of a regulation or order implementing the Act. S
Although the Act labels the penalties "civil," the first circuit has indicated that
the penalty provisions should be strictly construed because they are "penal in
nature." ' °

The civil penalty subsection offers three alternatives. When a person is
found to be in violation of "any requirement" of the Environmental Quality Act,
the secretary may assess two penalties and may also suspend or revoke the
violator's permit. First, the secretary may impose a penalty that enables the state
to recoup its costs in "any response action made necessary by (the] violation,"
except for those costs that are "voluntarily paid" by the violator. Second, the
secretary may order the violator to pay an additional penalty of not more that
$25,000 for each day of violation. In addition, "any permit, license, or variance

201. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928(a)-(c) (1994).
202. 40 C.F.R. § 22 (1995).
203. 1995 La. Acts No. 1208, § 2; No. 947, §S. For constitutional questions regarding the 1995
legislation, see supra note 165.
204. La. R.S. 49:992(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 739; see also 1995 La.
Acts No. 947, § 8; supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
205. La. R.S. 30:2025(EXI) (Supp. 1996); In re Woodrow Wilson Construction Co., 563 So. 2d
385, 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
206. In re Woodrow Wilson Const. Co., 563 So. 2d 385, 391 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990). But cf
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 250, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2642 (1980) (penalty established in the
oil spill provisions of the Clean Water Act is not sufficiently criminal to require application of the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination).
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which has been issued to [the violator]" is subject to "revocation or suspension."'2o
The Act allows still a third type of civil penalty for certain types of
violations. The secretary may assess this penalty only when the violator acts
"intentionally, willfully, or knowingly"; when the violation "results in a discharge
or disposal which causes irreparable or severe damage to the environment"; or
when the "substance discharge[d] is one which endangers human life or health."
The maximum amount for this "additional penalty" is $1,000,000.20s
A separate subsection increases the civil penalty when the violator has
previously been issued a compliance order. When a person fails "to take
corrective action specified in [a compliance] order," the secretary may assess a
civil penalty of not more than $50,000 "for each day of continued violation or
noncompliance."" ° However, if the order with which the person failed to
comply was an emergency cease and desist order,2'10 "no penalty shall be
assessed if it appears
upon later hearing that said order was issued without
21
reasonable cause." '
The Act specifies nine factors that are to guide decisions regarding civil
penalties. The statute provides that the secretary "shall" consider the following
factors when "determining whether or not a civil penalty is to be assessed" and
when "determining the amount of the penalty or the amount agreed upon in
compromise":
(i) The history ofprevious violations or repeated noncompliance.
(ii) The nature and gravity of the violation.
(iii) The gross revenues generated by the respondent.
(iv) The degree of culpability, recalcitrance, defiance, or indifference to regulations or orders.
(v) The monetary benefits realized through noncompliance.
(vi) The degree ofrisk to human health or property caused by the
violation.
(vii) Whether the noncompliance or violation and the surrounding
circumstances were immediately reported to the department and whether
the violation or noncompliance was concealed or there was an attempt
to conceal by the person charged.

207. La. R.S. 30:2025(EXI) (Supp. 1996). When a compliance order is violated, the maximum
penalty is $50,000 per day. The definitional section of the Environmental Quality Act does not
define the term "response action." See La. R.S. 30:2004 (Supp. 1996). But cf 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25)
(1994) (defining the terms "'respond' or 'response"' for purposes of the federal Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act).
208. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(1) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
209. La. R.S. 30:2025(EX2) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
210. La. R.S. 30:2025(C)(1) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see supra notes 135-144 and accompanying
text.
211. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(3)(b) (1989).
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(viii) Whether the person charged has failed to mitigate or to make
a reasonable attempt to mitigate the damages caused by [the] noncompliance or violation.
(ix) The costs ofbringing and prosecuting an enforcement action,
such as staff time, equipment use, hearing records, and expert assistance.2t 2

The secretary may supplement the statutory criteria "by rule," but no supplementary rules have been issued.2 3
Any "aggrieved person" may appeal a penalty devolutively.2 1' In addition,
the person against whom the penalty is assessed is entitled to a suspensive
appeal. 2 5 If the penalty is upheld on appeal "in full or in part," the department is "entitled to legal interest ... from the date of imposition of the...
penalty until paid." If any penalty is "vacated or reduced," the department must
pay interest on any amount that it is required to refund.2t6
In its reported decisions, the first circuit has generally upheld civil penalties
that the secretary has imposed administratively. The appellate court has affirmed
the permissibility of using gross rather than net receipts in penalty determinations.2 " In addition, the court of appeal has also generally deferred to the
secretary's administrative discretion as to the size of civil penalties."'
The first circuit has limited the secretary's discretion in two respects. It
refused to permit the secretary to increase a penalty substantially merely because
a respondent exercised the statutory right to request a hearing.2t9 In addition,
the court of appeals has determined that the department must explicitly consider

212.

§ 2.

La.

R.S. 30:2025(EX3Xa) (1989 and Supp. 1996), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 947,

213. La. R.S. 30:2025(EX3)(b) (1989); see In re Deloris Evans, 1991 WL 341771 (La. Dept.
Envti. Quality Sept. 25, 1991) (decision of hearing officer rejecting department's penalty policy
because it had not been adopted by rule). The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act
direct the secretary to "establish criteria for the assessment of reasonably consistent department-wide
penalties based on the factors enumerated in (the Act]." If the secretary has not established "criteria
for a particular violation," the person imposing the penalty is to "exercise discretion" in applying the
statutory factors. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
214. La. RLS. 30:2050.21(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
215. La. R.S. 30:2050.22(A) (Supp. 1996).
216. La. R.S. 30:2025(EX6) (Supp. 1996), as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
217. In re McGowan, 533 So. 2d 999, 1004 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d
1168, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S. Ct. 80 (1989).
218. E.g., In re Witco Corp. Taft Facility. 618 So. 2d 1112 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993) (civil
penalty of 5130,000 for plant's failure to implement adequate groundwater monitoring system); In
re Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So. 2d 872 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989) ($73,034.49 for oil field
discharges); In re Sixty Acres, Inc., 546 So. 2d 575 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989) ($20,999.53 for violation
of landfill closure order).
219. In re McGowan, 533 So. 2d 999 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1168,
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S. Ct. 80 (1989).
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each of the factors enumerated in the Environmental Quality Act when it selects
a penalty.2"
In re McGowan22 1 reduced a penalty that was increased from $5,000 to
$56,000 after the person against whom the penalty was assessed demanded a
hearing. According to the court of appeal, "the factors constituting the basis for
the amount of penalty were considered" when the penalty was initially assessed.
Thus, the "hearing itself appearfed] to be the only basis for the $51,000 increase
in penalty assessment." The appellate court found that justification for the
increase "to be arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.f
The first circuit's approach is a sound one. It allows the use of the statutory
criteria to select an appropriate penalty m without conferring authority to
punish an alleged violator for exercising the statutory right to request a hearing.
If the hearing produces new evidence regarding the factors on which the hearing
is based, the original assessment may be increased or decreased; if the hearing
merely confirms the information previously available to the department, the
penalty cannot be drastically increased merely because the respondent has
required the department to prove its claim.
The first circuit's approach in McGowan undoubtedly limits the ability to
consider "hearing records" as a penalty factor,22' but the limitation is not an
absolute one. The court of appeals did not forbid any increase in a penalty. It
merely declared that a ten-fold increase based solely on the cost of the appeal
was arbitrary.
As a matter of policy, increasing penalties merely because the respondent
exercises a statutory right to appeal is undesirable. External review of
administrative enforcement is not a necessity to be tolerated. Instead, it is the
basic mechanism for ensuring that penalties are assessed in a fair and consistent
manner.
To the extent that the legislature wants the department to recoup the cost of
appealing penalty determinations from violators, the statute should provide for
apportioning the total cost of hearings rather than requiring a violator to bear the
cost of a particular hearing. The legislature should direct the secretary to issue
rules that compute the total cost of hearing records for the previous year and
allow the secretary to consider that cost in setting future penalties.
A 1994 decision of the first circuit imposes an additional restriction on the
secretary's administrative power to assess penalties. In re Amco Construction
Co.22 held that the secretary has a mandatory duty to consider each of the

220.

In re Amco Constr. Co., 633 So. 2d 727 (La. App. IstCir. 1993).

221. 533 So. 2d 999 (La. App. IstCir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1168, cert. denied, 493
U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 80 (1989).
222. McGowan, 533 So. 2d at 1005.
223. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(3)(a) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
224. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(3)(a)(ix) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
225. 633 So. 2d 727 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
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factors enumerated in the Environmental Quality Act226 when assessing
penalties administratively. In Amco, the secretary failed to consider two
factors--the gross revenues of the respondent and the cost of bringing the
enforcement proceedings-because no evidence regarding them was presented
at the penalty hearing. Ruling that the department had failed to perform its
statutory duty, the court of appeal "vacate[d] the penalty and remand[ed] the
matter [to the secretary] for reconsideration of the penalty after appropriate
consideration of all of the [statutory] factors." '27
The extent to which Amco will hamper the administrative imposition of civil
penalties is unclear. The department should have little difficulty in estimating
the costs of enforcement. It can simply require enforcement personnel to keep
time records, multiply the time spent by the proper hourly rates, and make an
appropriate addition for overhead expenses. On the other hand, the department
may lack information regarding the gross receipts of the person against whom
the penalty is assessed. Moreover, the Environmental Quality Act gives the
secretary no express authority to order that the information be provided. Thus,
the first circuit may have to find the authority to compel this information in the
secretary's general information-gathering authority 228 or to imply an exception
to the Amco rule when the person assessed refuses to provide the information on
gross receipts.
The Amco opinion is a surprising one. Previously, the first circuit had
sustained several penalties where the administrative record contained no
information on some of the factors that the statute requires the secretary to
consider."'
In reality, Amco may represent the dissatisfaction of the court of appeal with
the secretary's failure to justify what the court described as "a large fine for a
'
As noted above,"' the first circuit has been reluctant to
minor violation."23
declare civil penalties arbitrary or capricious or to characterize the amount
assessed as an abuse of discretion. In Amco, the court avoided making such a
finding by seizing on the failure to consider two statutorily mandated factors as
a basis for requiring the secretary to reconsider a penalty that seemed disproportionate to the underlying violation.
What Amco demonstrates is the need for the department to adopt rules to
guide the administrative assessment of penalties.23 ' The Environmental Quality

226.

La. R.S. 30:2025(EX3) (1989 and Supp. 1996); see supra notes 212-213 and accompanying

text.
227. 633 So. 2d at 735.
228. La. R.S. 30:2011(DX5), (14) (1989 and Supp. 1996).
229. E.g., In re Witco Corp. Taft Facility, 618 So. 2d 1112, 1119 (La. App. 1stCir. 1993); In
re Mullins & Pritchard, Inc., 549 So. 2d 872, 877-78 (La. App. I st Cir. 1989).
230. 633 So. 2d at 735.
231. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
232. For EPA's policy regarding administrative assessment of penalties, see U.S. EPA, Policy
on Civil Penalties, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. Admin. Materials 35,000, 35,083 (1984).
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Act directs the department to establish "policies for the enforcement of the...
Act," 3 and the department had an informal penalty policy at one time.
However, a hearing officer ruled that the secretary had to issue a rule incorporating the policy before it could be used to assess penalties in cases in which the
respondent demanded a hearing.234 Rather than proposing a rule, the secretary
simply abandoned the policy. Perhaps Amco will prompt the department to
reconsider the need for a formal penalty policy.
The Environmental Quality Act addresses several procedural details
regarding the administrative imposition ofcivil penalties. The penalty procedures
included in the 1995 amendments to the Act 2" generally follow those established for compliance orders236 except that they require a notice of violation
before a penalty is assessed. In addition, the first circuit has ruled that even an
administrative compromise of a penalty requires the concurrence of the attorney
general, and the 1995 amendments appear to continue that mandate. 2"7
Before a civil penalty may be assessed administratively, the secretary or
assistant secretary must issue a notice of violation to the respondent. 238 Ten

233. La. R.S. 30:2037(1) (1989).
234. In re Deloris Evans, 1991 WL 341771 (La. Dept. Envtl. Qual. Sept. 25, 1991).
235. La. R.S. 30:2050.3 (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
236. La. R.S. 30:2050.2 (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
237. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
238. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(B), 2050.25(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, §
1. For the details that the notice of violation must contain, see supra notes 147-152 and
accompanying text.
Before the 1995 amendments, the statute was ambiguous on the crucial question of who could
assess a civil penalty administratively. Section 2025(E) allowed the administrative imposition of civil
penalties by "the commission, the secretary, (or] the assistant secretary." At the time that language
was placed in the Act, the Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of Natural Resources
was responsible for administering the Act (which was then known as the Environmental Affairs Act),
and the Environmental Control Commission was the final administrative authority with respect to
penalty issues. 1979 La. Acts No. 449; see supra note 34. Thus, the persons authorized to issue
penalty assessments were the Environmental Control Commission, the Secretary of the Department
of Natural Resources, and the Assistant Secretary of the Office of the Office of Environmental
Quality.
Exactly how the statutory provision applied to the officials responsible for environmental
enforcement at the time of the 1995 amendment was uncertain. After the Department of
Environmental Quality was created in 1983, see supranote 34, the legislature changed the definition
of"secretary" in the Act to refer to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality. La.
R.S. 30:2004(4) (1989). Similarly, the powers of the Environmental Control Commission were
transferred to the new secretary when the commission was abolished. La. R.S. 30:2013 (1989).
However, the legislature enacted no similar redefinition or transfer with respect to the term "the
assistant secretary." But see 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2, amending La. R.S. 30:2004(18) (Supp.
1996) (adding definition of assistant secretary). Thus, to find authority for an assistant secretary to
issue a penalty would have required interpreting "the assistant secretary" to mean any assistant
.secretary, which might suggest that an assistant secretary could impose penalties for any violation
of the Act, not simply those chapters for which the assistant secretary's office was responsible;
construing the general grants of administrative and enforcement authority to the various assistant
secretaries as broad enough to encompass the assessment of civil penalties, see La. R.S. 30:2011 (C)
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days after the notice of violation is given to the respondent, the penalty may be
assessed, 9 and the secretary or assistant secretary must notify the respondent
of the penalty assessment by personal delivery or by certified mail, return receipt
requested.2 O The penalty assessment must describe the violation that gives rise
to the penalty "with reasonable specificity," include the amount of the penalty,
and advise the respondent of "the right to an adjudicatory hearing."2 ' Unless
a request for an adjudicatory hearing is submitted within thirty days after the
respondent receives notice of the penalty assessment, the assessment "is a final
enforcement action."24
With respect to adjudicatory hearings and administrative finality, the penalty
procedures in the 1995 amendments are identical to those established for
'
compliance orders. 43
Any "aggrieved person" other than the respondent may
request an adjudicatory hearing, but only the respondent has a "right to an
adjudicatory hearing."2" If the secretary does not grant the request for a
hearing within thirty days, "the applicant" may seek "de novo review of the
secretary's action in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court.""24 Moreover, after

(1989 and Supp. 1996); La. R.S. 36:238 (1985 and Supp. 1996); cf La. R.S. 30:2011(C)(I)(d) (1989
and Supp. 1996) (office of legal affairs and enforcement "shall enforce all of the Chapters of" the
Act); or locating a document by which the secretary had delegated the authority to assess penalties.
See La. R.S. 30:2011(0) (1989) (granting the assistant secretary those powers assigned by law or
delegated by the secretary). Although Act 1160 of 1995 continued the prior statutory language, the
courts are likely to give effect to the amendments in Act 947. See supra note 137.
239. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(C) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
240. La. R.S. 30:2050.23(A), (B) (Supp. 1996).
241. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(CX2) (Supp. 1996).
.242. La. R.S. 30:2050.3(D), 30:2050.4(E) (Supp. 1996).
243. See supra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
Prior to the 1995 amendments, the Act required that the "person charged" be "given a notice and an
opportunity for a hearing" before the secretary assessed acivil penalty. That language appeared to make
the assessment of acivil penalty an adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act and, thus, to
require an adjudicatory hearing when one was requested by person against whom the penalty was
assessed. See La. R.S. 49:951(1), (3), 955 (1987); accord Environmental Control Comm'n Rules of
Procedure, Rule 3.6 (all hearings for civil penalties shall be adjudicative). Although "an opportunity
for hearing" had to be granted when a civil penalty was assessed, a hearing did not have to be held in
every case. The Act allowed the person charged to waive the hearing "on the issue of whether or not
a violation has occurred, ... culpability for [the] violation and any other ultimate issue." When the
hearing was waived, the penalty was assessed "upon the uncontested facts." La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(4)
(1989), prior to repeal by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, §3.
The Environmental Control Commission Rules added a few details to the pre-1995 statutory
provisions regarding penalty procedures. The rules confirmed that all penalty hearings were adjudicative
and that penalty assessments could be served by hand or by certified mail, return receipt requested.
Environmental Control Comm'n Rules ofProcedure, Rules 1.3, 3.6. They also allowed "[alny person
possessing a real interest that might be adversely affected" by the penalty assessment to petition the
secretary to hold an adjudicatory hearing, and they permitted the secretary to make "informal disposition
... ofany case ofadjudication by stipulation, agreed settlement or consent order" except where informal
disposition is "precluded by law." Id. Rule 5.4, repealed, 21 La. Reg. 556 (1995).
244. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(A), (B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
245. Id. § 2050.4(G).
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October 1, 1996, the administrative law judge rather than the secretary is
responsible for issuing "the final decision or order."2
The Act allows the public, as well as the attorney general, to participate in
penalty proceedings. It provides for public comments "[p]rior to the adjudicatory
hearing" and requires that the public comments be made available "to the parties
to the adjudicatory hearing."247 In addition, the secretary "shall invite and
receive written public comment" and "may hold a public hearing" regarding a
proposed settlement or compromise of a penalty. 8 The Act also requires that
the attorney general must concur before the secretary may settle or compromise
"claims for any penalty." 9 This language relating to settlements was
originally found in the subsection entitled "Settlement of Suits." Nonetheless,
the first circuit held that it also applied to administrative settlements of penalties
even when the secretary agreed to the settlement before suit is filed.250
A former Secretary of the Department of Environmental Quality suggested
that the concurrence authority of the attorney general was limited to the legal
sufficiency of the proposed compromise."' That position should be rejected
because it is inconsistent with the role that the attorney general plays in the
Nothing in the statute indicates that the attorney
settlement process.'
general's role is limited to legal issues. A more reasonable interpretation is to
construe the statutory requirement as an administrative check to insure that the
secretary is not unduly lenient in compromising penalties.
In re BASF Corp."53 is the leading decision regarding the administrative
assessment of civil penalties. Applying the statutory and regulatory provisions
in existence prior to the 1995 amendments,2 ' the first circuit concluded that
neither the statute nor any rule required "an adjudicatory hearing in all

246. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 2.
247. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(I) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
248. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(B), (D) (Supp. 1996). The secretary may hold a public hearing when
a "written request for a public hearing has been filed by twenty-five persons, by a governmental
subdivision or agency, or by an association having not less than twenty.five members who reside in
the parish in which the facility is located" or when the "secretary finds a significant degree of public
interest in the settlement or compromise." Id.
249. La. R.S. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.Prior to the
1995 amendments, La. R.S. 30:2025(H) (1989) contained indentical language.
Cir. 1988), writgranted, 539 So. 2d
250. In re BASF Corp., 538 So. 2d 635, 644 (La. App. Ist
624, writ denied, 539 So. 2d 624, writ denied, 541 So. 2d 900 (1989).
251. See Letter dated March 20, 1992 from Kai David Midboe, Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality, to Richard leyoub. Attorney General. For the Attorney General's response.
which rejected this interpretation of the scope of concurrence authority, see Letter dated March 23,
1992 from Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, to Kai Midboe, Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Quality.
252. Cf La. R.S. 30:2050.1(C) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1 (assistant
secretary for legal affairs and enforcement shall review all administrative enforcement actions "for
legal sufficiency").
253. 538 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989).
254.

See supra note 243.
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enforcement proceedings ' s to assess civil penalties or granted "the public an
absolute right to be heard concerning violations of the Act." 25 Although the
rules allowed interested persons to petition for an adjudicatory hearing, the
secretary had discretion as to whether a hearing should be held. ' In short,
the statute and rules allowed the secretary to settle or to resolve "any claim
informally," when the person against whom the penalty was assessed waived the
right to a hearing; moreover, they allowed the secretary to hold "[m]eetings"
with the alleged violator "in an attempt to settle" a claim, and these meetings
were not "hearings" for which public notice and comment were required.5
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act also give the
secretary the authority to prescribe rules establishing "informal procedures" for
the assessment of civil penalties." 9 As with compliance orders, 21 the informal procedures may only be used with the consent of the respondent;26' and
a penalty assessed after informal procedures is "a final enforcement action,2 62
even though the procedures are not subject to the normal rules regarding
'
adjuciations or adjudicatory hearings. 63
In the rules establishing the informal
procedures, the secretary must identify the penalty assessment to which the
informal procedures apply,2" and the rules must provide for documentary
evidence that a violation occurred, notice of the evidence to the respondent, an
opportunity for the respondent to rebut the evidence, participation
by the public,
265
and listing of the final action on the public enforcement list.
The first circuit has ruled that civil penalties must be strictly construed
because they are "penal in nature,"112 " but no Louisiana decision has yet
considered whether the civil penalties authorized by the Environmental Quality
Act are sufficiently punitive to require that they be classified as criminal. In
Ward v. United States, 267 the United States Supreme Court held the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable to a $500 civil
penalty that the Coast Guard imposed under the oil spill provisions of the Clean
Water Act. For several reasons, however, Ward does not definitively resolve the
issue of whether the privilege applies to the civil penalties that the Department
of Environmental Quality is authorized to impose. For one thing, the punitive

255.
256.

538 So. 2d at 643.
Id.

257. Environmental Control Comm'n Rules of Procedure, Rule 3.0. The secretary now exercises
the duties of the "assistant secretary" to whom the rule refers. See supra note 34.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

538 So. 2d at 643.
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
See supra notes 195-199 and accompanying text.
La. 11S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § I.
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(D) (Supp. 1996).
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(C) (Supp. 1996).
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(A) (Supp. 1996).
La. R.S. 30:2050.6(B) (Supp. 1996).
In re Woodrow Wilson Constr. Co., 563 So. 2d 385, 391 (La. App. istCir. 1990).
448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
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aspect of the Coast Guard penalties in Ward was much less substantial because
the maximum penalty was much smaller than those provided in the Louisiana
statute.2" For another, the Coast Guard penalties had a clearer remedial
function. They went to a special fund devoted to environmental cleanup; 9 by
contrast, the Louisiana penalties become part of the state's general fund. 7
Finally, even if the federal courts would find Ward applicable to civil penalties
imposed by the Department ofEnvironmental Quality, the Louisiana courts might
construe the self-incrimination privilege of the Louisiana Constitution more
broadly. 271
Despite these grounds for distinguishing Ward,the Louisiana Supreme Court
should not, and probably will not, classify the civil penalties of the EnVironmental Quality Act as criminal. In upholding a drug forfeiture statute against
challenges under both state and federal constitutions, the Louisiana Supreme
Court cited Ward with approval.272 Under the approach outlined in Ward, the
legislative intent to classify the penalties as civil in nature is unmistakable.
Even if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to decide that the civil penalties
ofthe Environmental Quality Act are sufficiently criminal to invoke the privilege
against self incrimination, two doctrines will serve to limit the scope of the
privilege. First, the privilege only applies to natural persons, and corporations
are responsible for most environmental violations.7 3 Second, the required
records exception to the privilege would apply to most records that polluters are
required to keep in the regular course of business.7
E. Emergency Powers
Like most federal environmental statutes,275 the Louisiana Environmental
Quality Act grants the governmental agency responsible for environmental
protection broad authority to respond to emergencies. Because exercise of these
emergency powers does not require proof of a prior violation of the statute or its

268. The maximum penalty authorized in Ward was $5,000. The Coast Guard originally
imposed a $500 penalty, but the district court reduced it to $250. Id. at 245-47, 100 S.CL at 263940.
269.

33 U.S.C. § 1321(s) (1994).

270.

La. Const. art. VII, § 9.

Civil penalties are not included in the list of revenues that

constitute the Environmental Trust Fund. See La. R.S. 30:2015(C) (Supp. 1996).
271. La. Const. art. 1, § 13; cf In re Woodrow Wilson Construction Co., 563 So. 2d 385, 391

(La. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (describing civil penalties as "penal in nature").
272. State v. Spooner, 520 So. 2d 336, 358 (La. 1988).
273. See also United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248 (1944); Brasswell v. United
States, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S. Ct. 2284 (1988); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906).
274. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 110 S. Ct.
900 (1990); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391, 96 S. CL 1569 (1976); Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S. CL 1375 (1948).
275. See, e.g.. 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (1994) (Clean Air
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
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implementing regulations, use of the powers is not technically an administrative
enforcement action. Instead, the powers are special responsibilities the
legislature has given to the Department of Environmental Quality, "the primary
'
agency in the state concerned with environmental protection and regulation,"276
in fulfillment of the constitutional mandate to ensure that the state's natural
resources are "protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people."2 "
Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:2033 allows the secretary to take a variety of
actions following a declaration "that an emergency exists." The secretary may
make the emergency declaration after receiving evidence of an "incident" that
"require[s] immediate action to prevent irreparable damage to the environment
or a serious threat to life or safety based on recognized criteria or standards." 8 After the secretary has declared the existence of the emergency, the
statute mandates the secretary to "direct the attorney general to take such legal
action as the secretary deems necessary," '79 authorizes administrative action to
contain or to abate the source of pollution, 2" allows the secretary to "issue
such permit[s], variances, or other orders" as are necessary to respond to the
emergency,2 '" and permits the use of "emergency response personnel ...to
undertake necessary actions to contain and [to] abate the pollution source and
pollutants."'m
The scope of the administrative alternatives available under this section is
not altogether clear. In 1983, the Louisiana legislature passed two amendments
to Subsection C, which pertains to the secretary's emergency powers. Both
amendments allow the department to "undertake the containment and abatement
of the pollution source and pollutants" and to "retain personnel for these
purposes who shall operate under [the] direction" of the responsible departmental
official.283 However, Act 97 of 1983, which created the Department of
Environmental Quality, grants this power to the "secretary"; while Act 459,
which was enacted after Act 97 but became effective before the earlier Act,2
276. La. R.S. 30:201 1(A)(l) (Supp. 1996).
277. La. Const. art. IX,§ 1.
278. La. R.S. 30:2033(A) (1989).
279. La. R.S. 30:2033(B) (Supp. 1996).
280. La. R.S. 30:2033(C) (1989).
281. La. R.S. 30:2033(D) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2. Prior to the
1995 amendments, this language was contained in La. R.S. 30:2024(B) (Supp. 1996). The subsection
did not define what constituted an "emergency," nor did it expressly cross reference the Section 2033
or require the secretary to "declare" that an emergency exists. However, an implied incorporation
of the standards of the section on emergency powers would have given a reasonable definition to the
term. That approach would also have given meaning to the primary purposes of Subsection 2024B,
which were to make the emergency orders "effective immediately upon issuance" and to provide that
"any appeal or request for review shall not suspend the implementation of the action ordered."
282. La. R.S. 30:2033(E) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2.
283. La. R.S. 30:2033(C) (1989).
284. The legislature enacted Act 97 on June 16, 1983, the governor signed it on June 24, 1983,
and it became effective on February 1, 1984; the legislature enacted Act 459 on June 27, 1983, the
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grants expanded powers to "the assistant secretary" (who, at that time, was the
Assistant Secretary of the Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of
Natural Resources).
In addition to the powers confirmed by Act 97, Act 459 empowers the
assistant secretary to order action by the "owner, operator, or person responsible
for the pollution." These orders can direct the responsible person "to conduct
testing, monitoring, and analysis to ascertain the nature and extent of [the] hazard
or [to] undertake the containment, abatement, or cleanup of [the] pollution source
and pollutants." Moreover, Act 459 expressly makes failure to comply with any
of these orders a "violation" that is subject to the enforcement provisions of the
Act.
Both the formal legal rules regarding legislation and common sense suggest
that the secretary should be able to exercise the broader powers conferred by Act
459. The Louisiana Supreme Court has ruled that the date of the final legislative
action on a statute, not the effective date, controls when statutes conflict, 5 and
final legislative action on Act 459 occurred after the final legislative action on
Act 97. Furthermore, when the legislature passes two acts in the same session,
the courts give effect to both whenever possible, 2" and no real conflict exists
between Act 97 and Act 459. Act 97 merely made a technical amendment
clarifying that the powers previously exercised by the Assistant Secretary of the
Office of Environmental Affairs in the Department of Natural Resources would
thereafter be exercised by the Secretary of the newly created Department of
Environmental Quality. Before the statute creating the new department went into
effect, the legislature broadened the powers available to the assistant secretary.
Thus, the courts can implement the apparent purpose of both acts by ruling that
Act 459 granted expanded powers to the assistant secretary and that Act 97
transferred those powers to the Secretary of the Department of Environmental
Quality when the new department was created.
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act both distinguish the
emergency powers conferred by Section 2033 from emergency cease and desist
orders 28' and confirm that permits, variances, and orders issued pursuant to a
declaration of emergency are "effective immediately upon issuance." An "appeal
or request for review" does not "suspend the implementation of the action
ordered," but "[a]n action for injunctive relief against an order" may be brought

governor signed it on July 6, 1983, and it became effective on July 6, 1983. See 1983 La. Acts Nos.
97, 459; 1983 La. Leg. Calendar (9th Reg. Sess. 1983).
285.
State v. St. Julian, 221 La. 1018, 61 So. 2d 464, 466 (1952); Blanchard v. Brown, 388 So.
2d 86S, 869 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 386 So. 2d 919 (1980); Louisiana ex rel. Saint v. Toups,
95 So. 2d 55, 62 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).

286. Marguette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Normand, 249 La. 1027, 192 So. 2d 552, 553 (1968); City
of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 216 La. 116, 43 So. 2d 237, 247 (1950).
287. La. R.S. 30:2033(F) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 2. For a
discussion ofpotential constitutional challenges to Act 947, see supra note 165. For detailed analysis
of emergency cease and desist orders, see supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
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in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court without exhausting administrative
remedies. To obtain relief in the action for injunctive relief, the party bringing
the action must demonstrate, "by clear and convincing evidence, that granting
injunctive relief shall not endanger or cause damage to the public health or the
environment."" 1
IV. CIVIL

ENFORCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT

Like most federal environmental statutes, 99 the Louisiana Environmental
Quality Act authorizes governmental agencies to initiate a variety of civil actions
to enforce its provisions. In the past, the most common form used in Louisiana
has been an ex parte petition by the state to collect civil penalties or to enforce
compliance orders. 29° Alternatively, the state may file suit to assess a civil
penalty, to collect damages resulting from a violation, or to secure injunctive
relief to abate a violation.29 In addition, state law also provides a special
authorization for the national guard and local governments to recover certain
costs they incur in responding to environmental violations. 92
As enforcement shifts from administrative to judicial sanctions, the
Environmental Quality Act establishes a complicated division of authority
between the secretary and the attorney general. Subsection A of the enforcement
section provides that the secretary shall bring "any civil action necessary to carry
out the provisions of [the Act]" and that the secretary "shall be represented by
'
the attorney general."293
Subsection B authorizes the "department" to "bring
a civil action in the name of the state to recover any damages or penalties
resulting from a violation" of the Act or the rules or orders implementing the
Act. It also provides that the attorney general "may" file suits to assess, or to
collect, penalties when cases are "referred" by the secretary. 294 However,
Subsection G provides that the attorney general "shall have charge of and shall
prosecute all civil cases arising out of' any violation of the Act, "including the
recovery of penalties."29 Furthermore, the Act also requires that the secretary
obtain the "concurrence" of the attorney general before settling "any suits,
disputes, or claims for any penalty."' 9 In addition, the 1995 amendments

288. La. R.S. 30:3033(D) (Supp. 1996).
289. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), (d) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (g)
(1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994) (Clean Air Act).
.290.
La. R.S. 30:2025(G)(2) (Supp. 1996); see infra notes 305-311 and accompanying text.
291. La. R.S. 30:2025(A), (B) (Supp. 1996); see infra notes 312-319 and accompanying text.
292. La. R.S. 30:2025(K) (Supp. 1996); see infra note 327 and accompanying text.
293. La. R.S. 30:2025(A) (Supp. 1996).
294. La. R.S. 30:2025(B) (Supp. 1996).
295. La. R.S. 30:2025(G) (Supp. 1996).
296. La. R.S.30:2050.7(A)(Supp. 1996),asaddedby 1995 La. ActsNo. 947, § l;seesupranotes
193-194,249-250 and accompanying text. Prior to the 1995 amendment, the compromise provision was
found in La. R.S. 30:2025H. See In re Recovery I, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); In re
BASF Corp., 538 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 900 (1989).
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grant the secretary authority, "with the concurrence of the attorney general," to
use departmental lawyers to file suit when the attorney general declines to file
27

suit or fails to respond to a request from the secretary.

Although the details of the Environmental Quality Act are not entirely
consistent, one can discern a general pattern in the division of responsibilities.
As the head of "the primary agency in the state concerned with environmental
29 the secretary may demand
protection and regulation,""
judicial enforcement

when administrative sanctions are inadequate and may initiate civil action when
the attorney general declines or fails to act. On the other hand, the attorney
general, "the chief legal officer of the state,"2 " can also initiate judicial action

to compel adherence to the state's environmental laws. Moreover, once litigation
is initiated, the attorney general is responsible for strategy and tactics. Finally,
the legislature has also prescribed that the attorney general is to serve as a check
to insure that the secretary is not unduly accommodating in compromising the
state's position with respect to civil penalties.
A 1994 decision of the first circuit suggested that the secretary might also
have the power to settle some lawsuits without the concurrence of the attorney
general. The court ruled that the attorney general's concurrence was not required
to compromise an administratively imposed compliance order when the order did
not include a civil penalty; according to the court of appeal, the concurrence
requirement only applied to disputes or claims that involve penalties. 3" If, as
the first circuit held, "for any penalty" modified "disputes, 30 ' itwould also
seem to modify "suits." Under this interpretation, the statute only required the
concurrence of the attorney general when a suit compromised by the secretary
302
involved a civil penalty.
The 1995 amendments to the Environmental Quality Act confirm the
interpretation of the preceding paragraph. The Act now explicitly provides that
the attorney general's concurrence "is not required for the secretary to settle or
[to] resolve (1) a suit, dispute, or claim in regard to a compliance order or (2)

297. La. R.S. 30:2025(A)(1), (B)(1), (C)(1), (G)(1), 2033(B) (Supp. 1996), as amended by 1995
La. Acts No. 1160, § 1. Act 947 also amended some of the same sections; because final legislative

action was completed on Act 1160 first, Act 947 should prevail in cases of conflict. However, the
authority of the secretary to use departmental lawyers will probably be seen as supplementary to Act
947, which does not address the issue. See supra notes 285-286 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of possible constitutional challenges to Act 947, see supra note 165.
298. La. R.S. 30:2011(A)(1) (Supp. 1996).
299. La. Const. art. IV, § 8.
300.

In re Recovery 1, Inc., 635 So. 2d 690 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).

301. Id. at 698-99.
302. That interpretation of the first circuit opinion was not, however, completely convincing prior
to the 1995 amendments. It seemed to conflict with at least two other provisions of the enforcement
section. La. K-S. 30:2025(A) declared that the secretary "shall be represented by the attorney
general" in "any civil action necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Environmental Quality
Act]." In addition, Section G places the attorney general in charge of ... all civil cases arising out
of any violation" of the Act.
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30 3
any part of a suit, dispute, or claim insofar as it regards a compliance order.
Of course, to the extent that the attorney general's powers regarding the
settlement of lawsuits are derived from the constitutional position as the state's
"chief legal officer, ' '3M legislative restrictions of those powers after a lawsuit
has been filed may violate separation of powers principles.

A. Collection ofPenalties and Enforcement of Orders
The Environmental Quality Act provides for summary enforcement of the
secretary's penalty assessments and compliance orders. When the person who has
been assessed an administrative penalty or required to perform "specific compliance actions" fails to pay the penalty or to undertake the compliance actions,
Subsection G ofthe general enforcement section directs the attorney general to file
a civil action "seeking to make the order of the secretary a judgment ofthe district
30 S
court and making the judgment executory for all purposes provided by law."
To convert the secretary's order into a district court judgment, the attorney general
files "an ex parte petition in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, in accordance
with Code of Civil Procedure Article 2782, attaching a certified copy of the order
to the petition."3"' When the ex parte petition is filed, the Act directs the district
court to "grant the relief prayed for and [to] issue a judgment without a trial de
novo of the facts supporting the order."' °
Notably absent from the subsection providing for summary enforcement is
a right to demand a hearing on the violation that gives rise to the penalty
assessment or compliance order. That omission is both reasonable and
constitutional because other avenues of judicial review are available. A party
who appeals a compliance order'" or penalty assessment 309 has already
received the administrative hearing and judicial review that due process requires.
On the other hand, a party who chooses not to appeal an assessment or order has
elected not to exercise the due process rights and is thus bound by the
administrative determination.

La. R.S. 30:2050.7(A) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1.
La. Const. art. IV, § 8.
La. R.S. 30:2025(G) (Supp. 1996).
La. C. Civ. P. art. 2782 provides:
A creditor wishing to have judgment of a Louisiana court made executory, as provided
in Article 2781. may file an ex parte petition complying with Article 891, with a certified
copy of the judgment annexed, praying that the judgment be made executory. The court
shall immediately render and sign its judgment making the judgment of the other
Louisiana court executory.
The judgment thus made executory may be executed or enforced immediately as it if
had been a judgment of that court rendered in an ordinary proceeding.
307. La. R.S. 30:2025(G) (Supp. 1996).
308. La. ILS. 30:2025(C) (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text.
309. La. R.S. 30:2024(B), 2025(E) (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 243-246 and accompanying

303.
304.
305.
306.
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The defendant in the enforcement action does have a limited right to contest
judicial enforcement of a penalty assessment or compliance order. "Upon good
cause shown and upon the posting of a bond in favor of the state as the court may
require," the Act allows "[the] person against whom a judgment is rendered
requiring specific compliance actions to be undertaken" to "seek an extension,
modification, or suspension ofthejudgment by summary proceeding." The person
challenging the judgment must seek the extension, modification, or suspension
"within ten days of service of the judgment," and the hearing on the challenge is
limited "to the issue ofwhether or not compliance has taken place." 3"
The Act does not expressly provide for a hearing on penalty assessments, but
the judgment ordering payment ofa penalty could reasonably be construed as one
"requiring specific compliance actions to be undertaken." That construction would
entitle the person who is ordered to pay the penalty to a hearing limited to the issue
of whether compliance has taken place, i.e., whether the penalty has been paid.
The only hearing mentioned in the subsection providing for summary
enforcement is a hearing in opposition to an enforcement action initiated by the
attorney general. The first circuit has, however, construed the subsection as
allowing a "suit for declaratory judgment" that challenges the constitutionality of
the enforcement scheme established in the subsection. Because the provisions of
the subsection relate "merely to a procedure employed by the Attorney General in
the district court" and not "to issues that might ever be brought before the
[department]," allowing litigation ofthe constitutional issue in the district court "in
no way undermines the statutory scheme." " '
B. Assessment ofPenaltiesandDamages
As an alternative to judicial enforcement of administrative sanctions, the
Environmental Quality Act permits the secretary to proceed directly to a civil
action. Because this approach requires the state to prove the violation in an
ordinary civil suit and grants the district court discretion as to the amount of the
penalty that is imposed, the state has seldom, if ever, preferred it to the initial use
ofadministrative sanctions. The civil action does, however, grant the state the right
to recover damages, a remedy that is not available in administrative enforcement
actions. Moreover, the changes that the 1995 legislature made with respect to
administrative issuance ofcompliance orders and assessments of penalties' may
incline the secretary to reconsider the use ofcivil enforcement actions.
Subsection B of the enforcement section permits the department to bring a
civil enforcement action "in the name of the state" for the recovery of "any
310. La. R.S. 30:2025(0)(2) (Supp. 1996). See Marine Shale Processors v. State, 551 So. 2d
643 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 555 So. 2d 465 (1989) ("IT]he only issue before the trial court
in the nullity suit is whether or not [Marine Shale Processors has complied with the water resource

order.').
311.
312.

Marine Shale Processors, 551 So. 2d at 643.
See supra notes 174-185, 243.246 and accompanying text.
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damages or penalties resulting from a violation of any requirement" of the
Environmental Quality Act or any rule or order issued pursuant to the Act. In
the civil action, the attorney general represents the department, and the Act
provides that the attorney general "may" file suit on cases referred by the
department. Jurisdiction lies in the state district courts, and proper venue is "any
parish in which damage has occurred or any parish where the defendant resides,
is domiciled, or has his principal place of business."' 3
A civil action to recover damages or penalties does not preclude other forms
of judicial relief. However, the violator is entitled to a credit for any amounts
paid in response to any civil penalties assessed by the secretary. The credit
applies to "the amount for which [the violator] is held liable to the state in a
judgment or settlement" that "is based on the same violation or violations."""
In the past, the department has had little incentive to use civil actions to
assess civil penalties. The civil action has had two significant disadvantages
First, as the
when compared to administrative imposition of civil penalties.'
plaintiff in the civil enforcement action, the department bears the burden ofproof
without the presumption of correctness that attaches to an administrative
assessment. Second, the judge rather than the secretary has the discretion as to
the amount of the penalty." Not surprisingly, the reported decisions on civil
penalties all involve administrative assessments.
In 1995, the legislature made two changes that may render civil enforcement
more attractive to the department in the future. First, an appeal from an
administratively imposed civil penalty now goes to the Nineteenth Judicial
District Court, rather than to the First Circuit." 7 Second, since October 1,
1996, the administrative law judge, rather than the secretary, makes the final
Without the expedited
administrative decision in enforcement actions."
appeal to the first circuit, the secretary may prefer-at least, on some occasions--to prove the violation before an elected district judge rather than before
an appointed administrative law judge in the Department of Civil Service.
The civil action has always had one additional advantage over the
administrative imposition of sanctions: it allows the state to recover damages,
a remedy that is not available in an administrative enforcement action.

313. La. R.S. 30:2025(B) (Supp. 1996). If the attorney general declines or fails to respond to
the secretary's request to initiate a civil action, the secretary can, "with the concurrence of the
attorney general," use departmental lawyers to file the civil action. Id., as amended by 1995 La. Acts
No. 1160, § 1.
314. La. R.S. 30:2025(B) (Supp. 1996).
315. See supra notes 202-258 and accompanying text.
316. Under federal environmental statutes, federal courts have held that they are not obligated
to follow the penalty policy of the Environmental Protection Agency. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay
Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F. 2d 304
(4th Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 484 U.S. 49, 108 S.Ct. 376 (1987).
317. 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 8; No. 1208, § 2. Review in the district court is still limited to
the administrative record. La. IKS. 30:2050.21(C) (Supp. 1996).
318. La. K.S. 49:992(B) (Supp. 1996), as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 2.
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Moreover, the Act appears to give the district court broad discretion to award
restoration or compensatory damages as well as to allow the state to recover the
amounts it has spent in detecting and correcting the violation. When the court
"determines that a violation of [the Act] has occurred," the statute directs that the
assessment of damages "shall include ...

the costs of all reasonable and

necessary investigations made or caused to be made by the state in connection
therewith." It also provides that the court is to "take into consideration" both
"the costs of restoring the affected area to its condition as it existed before the
violation and its present market value."319
C. Injunctive Relief
Both the section of the Environmental Quality Act allowing the secretary to
issue emergency and desist orders 320 and the citizen suit section provide for
injunctive relief,321' but no other section of the Act expressly authorizes the
secretary to seek injunctive relief from the courts.322 Nonetheless, the initial
subsection of the enforcement section should be broad enough to permit the
secretary to obtain an injunction. That subsection allows the secretary,
"represented by the attorney general," to bring "[a]ny civil action necessary to
carry out the provisions" of the Act. 323 Because the enforcement section of the
Environmental Quality Act lacks specific provisions regarding injunctions (except
for emergency cases), the normal rules of the Code of Civil Procedure should
govern.32'
Prior to 1995, the secretary gained few advantages by seeking an injunction
rather than issuing an administrative compliance order. In the civil action, the
department bears the burden of proof, and discretion as to the scope of the order
passes from the secretary to the district court. As with administrative penalties,
the 1995
amendments may, however, make civil actions more attractive in the
325
future.

319. Cf Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co., 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991) (allowing a
private action for restoration damages despite a prior administrative cleanup order by the
Commissioner of Conservation). But see Abramson v. Florida Gas Transmission Co., 909 F. Supp.
410 (E.D. La. 1995) (limiting property order to diminution of market value).
320. La. R.S. 30:2050.8 (Supp. 1996), as addedby 1995 La. Acts No. 947, § 1; see supra notes
135-144 and accompanying text.

321. La. R.S. 30:2026(AX2) (1989); see infra notes 372-391 and accompanying text.
322. If the state receives authority to issue permits under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act,
see La. R.S. 30:2073(1) (Supp. 1996), the secretary will be authorized to seek injunctive relief against
the owner or operator of a treatment works who fails to take appropriate enforcement action against
a person who wrongfully introduces pollutants into the treatment works. La. R.S. 30:2076.1 (Supp.
1996).
323. La. R.S. 30:2025(AXI) (Supp. 1996). If the attorney general declines or fails to file suit,
the secretary may direct departmental lawyers to file suit. Id., as amended by 1995 La. Acts No.

1160, § 1.
324.
325.

See, e.g., La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3601-3603.
See supra notes 317-318 and accompanying text.
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The secretary is most likely to bring an action for injunctive relief after
issuing an emergency cease and desist order." 6 Those administrative orders
expire after fifteen days, and that period of time will be insufficient to complete
the processing on a compliance order if the alleged violator requests a hearing.
To continue the cease and desist order beyond fifteen days, the secretary will
probably need to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction
from a court.
D. Recovery of Resources Used or Funds Expended
A 1990 amendment to the Environmental Quality Act gives the Louisiana
National Guard and local governments a special cause of action for money they
spend or resources they use in emergency response actions. Whenever the
national guard or a local government has "used resources or expended funds for
the protection of the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens, for prevention of
damage, or for the cleanup or repair of damages caused by or as a result of a
violation" of the Act, the amendment allows the recovery of those funds
expended or resources used that "are reasonably considered to be outside the
scope of normal activities. 32 7
The amendment imposes several limits on the statutory cause of action.
First, the statute provides that the right of recovery is subject to "the concurrence
or review of the department," but the Act provides no mechanism for obtaining
that concurrence or review. Second, the violator receives a credit for any "funds
recovered" by the national guard or local government against "the amount that
[the violator] is assessed" by the state or for which the violator is "held liable"
to the state. Third, the cause of action is subject to an extremely short
prescriptive period. The national guard or local government must bring its action
"within sixty days of the completion of the emergency response action."
V. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

The Environmental Quality Act establishes criminal penalties for a variety
of violations."' The general enforcement section contains criminal penalties

326. La. R.S. 30:2050.8(E) (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 135-144 and accompanying text.
327. La. R.S. 30:2025(K) (Supp. 1996).
328. Environmental statutes administered by other agencies also create special crimes. Those laws
provide criminal penalties for substantive violations of environmental laws administered by the
Commissioner ofAgriculture, La. R.S. 3:3278, 3373 (Supp. 1996), the Commissioner ofConservation.
La. R.S. 30:18(A)(4) (Supp. 1996), and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, La. R.S.
32:1514, 1518, 1521 (1989 and Supp. 1996), as well as for some reporting and monitoring violations.
E.g., La. R.S.30:17; 32:1510, 1514 (1989). The pesticide law is particularly noteworthy. It subjects
anyone who "violates" the provisions governing pesticide wastes to a twenty-five thousand dollar fine
and imprisonment for not more than five years without specifying any mental element. La. R.S. 3:3278
(Supp. 1996); cf La. R.S. 30:3373 (Supp. 1996) (providing six-month imprisonment and $500 fine for

engaging in any aspect of the structural pest control work without a permit).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 57

applicable to all portions of the Act. In addition, both the Hazardous Waste
Control Law and the Water Control Law provide additional criminal sanctions
for certain violations of their provisions.
Actual criminal prosecutions for violations of environmental laws have
materialized more slowly in Louisiana than in federal courts329 and in some
other states. 330 During the 1980s, several decisions of the Louisiana Supreme
Court raised questions about the viability of criminal prosecutions for violations
of the Environmental Quality Act. 33 In 1994, however, the court distinguished
these precedents and affirmed a felony conviction for a violation of hazardous
waste rules promulgated by the secretary.3
Whether the most recent decision
will actually prompt any substantial number of prosecutions under the Environmental Quality Act remains to be seen.
Two decisions from the mid-1980s held that legislative attempts to delegate
the power to prescribe rules punishable by criminal prosecution could violate the
state constitutional provision requiring separation of powers.3
In State v.
Broom,3 the Louisiana Supreme Court invalidated a statute prescribing
criminal penalties for violations of administrative regulations governing the
transportation of explosives. Two years later, State v. Taylor' held unconstitutional a statute that gave heads of correctional institutions the power to define
what constituted contraband, the possession ofwhich was punishable as a felony.
In both Broom and Taylor, the court ruled that the legislature had failed to
provide sufficient standards to guide the exercise of administrative discretion.
According to Broom, the deficiency in the explosives statute was the legislature's
"delegatfion] to the director of public safety [of] the authority to create
33
felonies.""
Similarly, Taylor found the contraband law unconstitutional

329.

See, e.g., United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert.

denied, 115 S.CL 939 (1995); United States v. Wagner, 29 F.3d 264 (7th Cir. 1994); United States

v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991). Compare United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990), with United States v. Johnson &
Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Crescent Ship Services, Inc.,

9 Toxics L. Rptr. 874 (E.D. La. 1995) (acceptance of guilty pleas by president and two high ranking
employees to dumping hazardous waste into Mississippi River); 9 Toxics L. Rptr. 818 (1994)
(summary of EPA enforcement statistics).
330. See. e.g., People v. Martin, 211 Cal. App. 3d 699 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1989); Waste
Conversion, Inc. v. States, 568 A.2d 738 (Pa. Commw. Ct.), appeal denied, 577 A.2d 892, cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 898, 111 S.Ct. 253 (1990).
331. State v. Taylor, 479 So. 2d 339 (La. 1985); State v. Union Tank Car Co., 439 So. 2d 377
(La. 1983); State v. Broom, 439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983).
332. State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., 639 So. 2d 707 (La. 1994).
333. La. Const. a. II, § 2, Article II, Section 1 divides state government into "legislative,
executive and judicial" branches. Section 2 then provides: "Except as otherwise provided by this
constitution, no one of these branches, nor any person holding office in one of them, shall exercise
power belonging to either of the others."
334.
335.
336.

439 So. 2d 357 (La. 1983).
479 So. 2d 339 (La. 1985).
439 So. 2d at 369.
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because it "failfed] to prescribe sufficient standards by which the power
'
delegated is to be exercised."337
A third decision from the 1980s involved the Air Control Law. Although
the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the specific conviction that was being
appealed, it upheld the legislature's delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Environmental Control Commission, even when violations of the regulations
could be punished criminally. Noting that "Louisiana courts [had previously]
upheld the constitutionality of statutes delegating broad powers to administrative
officers to determine the details of a legislative scheme," State v. Union Tank
Car Co.33 ruled that the air law satisfied the requirements of the state constitution. It contained "a scheme which provides intelligible standards sufficient to
guide the ... [commission] in its enforcement of the legislative will," and it
incorporated procedural safeguards that provided "ample protection against
'
arbitrary action by the [commission] in adopting the regulations."339
Because the Union Tank Cardecision preceded the opinions in Broom and
Taylor,' those later decisions created uncertainty regarding the continuing
vitality of the Union Tank Car doctrine. Arguably, the later cases limited the
legislature's ability to delegate the power to define criminal conduct, at least
when the crime was a felony.
4
The 1994 decision in State v. All Pro Paint and Body Shop, Inc.1 1
unequivocally reaffirmed the legislature's power to punish violations of
environmental regulations as felonies. According to Justice Kimball's opinion
in All ProPaint,Broom and Taylor did not establish a special delegation rule
when administrative regulations were punished as felonies. Instead, they merely
applied the well-established three-part test of Louisiana law:
[A] delegation of authority to an administrative agency is constitutionally valid if the enabling statute (1) contains a clear expression of
legislative policy, (2)prescribes sufficient standards to guide the agency
in the execution of that policy, and (3) is accompanied by adequate

337. 479 So. 2d at 343.
338. 439 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1983).
339. Id. at 383.
340. Confusion over the authoritativeness of Union Tank Car was compounded by the unusual
chronology of the Broom and Union Tank Car decisions. The supreme court issued its opinion in
Union Tank Car on the same day as the original decision in Broom was handed down. The original
decision in Broom upheld the delegation ofadministrative authority and the conviction that was based
on a violation of the administrative regulation. Union Tank Car relied on Broom as the basis for
upholding the delegation of authority to the Environmental Control Commission, but the court
reversed the conviction on the ground that the regulations were unconstitutionally vague. On
rehearing, Broom reversed the conviction it had previously upheld on the ground that the delegation
of regulatory authority was unconstitutional. Because the Broom opinion on rehearing took a
narrower view of the legislature's power to delegate rulemaking authority to administrative agencies
than the court had embraced on original hearing, the continuing validity of the language in the Union
Tank Car opinion regarding delegation was uncertain.
341. 639 So. 2d 707 (La. 1994).
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procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion by the
2
agency.
All Pro Paint involved a prosecution for violating the hazardous waste
disposal rules of the secretary. Applying the Union Tank Cartest, the supreme
court had little difficulty in concluding that the delegation of rulemaking
authority in the Hazardous Waste Control Law was constitutional. First, the law
satisfied the "clear expression of legislative policy" criterion because its "policy
and purpose provision establishe[d] a reasonable and definite governmental
policy warranting the exercise of the State's police power to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare by regulating hazardous waste." 343 Second, All Pro
Paintconcluded that "the statute when construed as a whole prescribes sufficient
standards to guide [the department's] administration and enforcement of the
legislative will. '3" Specifically, it authorized the secretary "to promulgate
regulations implementing a comprehensive state hazardous waste control program
consistent with 'the minimum criteria hereinafter set forth' and also 'consistent
with the mandates' of [federal law]." s Finally, the court found "adequate
procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of discretion" in the requirement
for a public hearing on any proposed rule, the provision for "judicial review of
the validity or applicability of rules," and the prescription of "procedures for
legislative review of rules."3
Read together, Union Tank Car and All Pro Paint recognize a broad
legislative power to punish violations of environmental regulations as crimes.
The supreme court has now upheld the delegations in both the air and hazardous
waste statutes, and the analysis it used appears equally
applicable to the other
347
statutes that form the Environmental Quality Act.
Of course, criminal prosecutions will always raise special problems. Union
Tank Caritselfapplied the rule ofstrict construction applicable to criminal statutes
to rules that are punishable as crimes.? s Inaddition, the government must prove
environmental crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and both federal 34 9 and
state 3 constitutions grant special protections to criminal defendants.

342. Id. at 712 (citing State v. Barthelemy, 545 So. 2d 531, 534 (La. 1989); Adams v. State, 458
So. 2d 1295, 1298 (La. 1984); State v. Union Tank Car Co., 439 So. 2d 377, 381 (La. 1983);
Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets v. McCrory. 237 La. 768, 787.88, 112 So. 2d 606. 613
(1959)). 343. 639 So. 2d at 716.
344. Id. at 716.17.
345. Id. at 717.
346. Id. at 720.
347. See. e.g., La. R.S. 30:2074(B) (1989 and Supp. 1996) (Water Control Law); 2154(B) (1989
and Supp. 1996) (Solid Waste Management and Resource Recovery Act).
348. 439 So. 2d 377, 385 (La. 1983). See also State v. Domangue, 649 So. 2d 1034 (La. 1995)
(fish and wildlife statute did not prohibit sale of improperly skinned alligator hide).
349. U.S. Const. amends. IV,V, VI, VIII.
350. La. Const. art. I, §§ 5, 13, 17, 18.
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When criminal violations occur, the role of state officials is advisory in
Louisiana. The Environmental Quality Act recognizes that local district attorneys
are responsible for initiating and controlling criminal prosecutions. The Act
does, however, direct the secretary to notify the appropriate district attorney
whenever the department determines that "a criminal violation may have
occurred." After giving the statutory notice, the department is to "provide the
district attorney with any and all information necessary to evaluate the alleged
violation for criminal prosecution" and to "cooperate fully with the district
attorney.""'
The general enforcement section of the Environmental Quality Act contains
both felony and misdemeanor subsections.3" The felony subsection provides
the most severe penalties for substantive violations in which human life or health
is, or could be, endangered. Other substantive violations, as well as failures to
pay fees or to file documents and reporting or monitoring violations, are
punished less severely in the misdemeanor section.
The felony subsection requires both a violation and an endangerment. It
limits the crime it creates to "[a]ny person who willfully or knowingly
discharges, emits, or disposes of any substance in contravention of any
provision" of the Environmental Quality Act or its implementing regulations or
of any condition of a permit or license issued pursuant to the Act. The
endangerment requirement provides that the substance must be "one that
endangers or that could endanger human life or health."
The penalties prescribed for these felony violations are substantial: a fine
of "not more than one million dollars or the cost of any cleanup made necessary
by [the] violation" plus a fine of "not more than one hundred thousand dollars
per violation and costs of prosecution" and imprisonment "at hard labor for not
more than ten years." The statute does, however, provide a special rule for
certain air violations resulting from "the incineration of cardboard by a retail or
wholesale merchant or by his employee3 or
agent." Those violations are not
3
subject "to the fine herein provided for." 5
The misdemeanor subsection covers four distinct offenses:
1) Violating the Act, a rule implementing the Act, or a term or
condition of a permit "when the substance does not endanger or could
not endanger human life or health."

351. La. R.S. 30:2025(FX4) (Supp. 1996).
352. La. &S. 30:2025(F) (Supp. 1996).
353. La. R.S. 30:2025(FXI) (Supp. 1996). The special provision does not extend to when the
incineration is a violation of "an applicable requirement of the federal Clean Air Act" and "the
emission source" emits, or has the potention to emit, more than ten tons of any toxic air pollutant
annually (or more than 25 tons of any combination of toxic air pollutants) or more than 100 tons
annually or any regulated air pollutant or it is "located in an ozone nonattainment area" and emits,
or has the potential to emit, more than specified levels of volatile organic compounds or oxides of
nitrogen.
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2) Failing to comply with "any fee or filing requirement" without
a prior notice to the department that the violator "contest[s] the legal or
factual basis of the matter."
3) Making "any false statement, representation, or certification" in
any "document filed or required to be maintained" under the Act or a
rule or permit issued under the Act.
4) Falsifying, tampering with, or rendering inaccurate "any
monitoring device or method required to maintained" under the Act or
a rule or permit issued under the Act.
The mental element for the first three of the misdemeanor offenses is the
requirement that the act be done "willfully or knowingly." For the fourth
offense, the mental element is "willfully or knowingly" for falsifying, "intentionally" for tampering, and "knowingly" for rendering inaccurate. A finding that
the misdemeanor section has been violated is a responsive verdict when an
individual is charged under the felony provision.354
The maximum penalty for a misdemeanor violation can include both a fine
and imprisonment. The fine cannot exceed "twenty-five thousand dollars per day
of violation, which may be assessed for each day the violation continues, and
costs of prosecution." The maximum term of imprisonment is one year.
Somewhat confusingly, in light of the clause allowing fines to be assessed for
each day a violation continues, a proviso at the end of the penalty section
declares that "a continuous violation extending beyond a single day shall be
considered a single violation." 3"
The subsection on criminal liability provides express authority for suspending sentences imposed on persons convicted of "illegally disposing of solid
waste." Those sentences may be suspended "if the offender is placed on
supervised probation for at least two years and, as a condition of probation,
cleans up the site or removes the6 illegally disposed waste from the site to the
satisfaction" of the department.1

Union Tank Car is the only reported decision that has considered the
criminal provisions in the general enforcement section of the Environmental
Quality Act. The provisions do, however, raise numerous legal issues that may
have to be addressed now that All Pro Painthas endorsed criminal prosecution
for violations of environmental regulations.
First, the mental element required by the criminal provisions ofSection 2025
is uncertain. The "willfully or knowingly" language differs from the language
35 7
normally used to specify criminal intent in the Louisiana Criminal Code.

354.
355.
356.
357.
Criminal
reference

La. R.S. 30:2025(F)(2) (Supp. 1996).
Id.
La. ILS. 30:2025(F)(5) (Supp. 1996).
See La. Crim.Code arts. 10, 11 (codified at La. R.S. 14:10, 11 (1986)). In the Louisiana
Code, "in the absence of qualifying provisions, the terms 'intent' and 'intentional' have
to 'general criminal intent."' Id. art. II.
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Nor is federal law a reliable guide. Most federal statutes require that a violation
be committed "knowingly"; whether either "willfully" or "intentionally" is a
significant addition is unclear.3
Second, the statutes are imprecise as to what elements are covered by the
mental element. In prosecutions under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, federal courts of appeals are divided on the question of whether the violator
must know more than that a discharge, emission, or disposal has occurred."'
Third, the reach of the enhancement for endangerment of human life or
health is unclear. Not only is the statute ambiguous as to whether the nature of
the substance or the circumstances in which it is handled give rise to the
enhancement, but the Act makes no attempt to define what constitutes an
endangerment. 36

Fourth, the provision regarding suspension of solid waste violations is
ambiguous. It does not indicate whether it is the sole ground for suspending a
sentence imposed under the Act or whether suspended sentences are also
appropriate for other violators.
Fifth, exactly what the special protection for retail merchants who violate air
regulations covers is unclear. Apparently, a merchant who is a natural person
remains subject to the possibility of being imprisoned for not more than ten
years. Moreover, the exemption covers "the fine herein provided for,"36' but
the subsection provides for two types of fines: one for "not more than one
million dollars or the cost of any cleanup made necessary by violation," and the
'
second for "not more than one hundred thousand dollars per violation."362
Sixth, the general criminal law provisions do not directly delineate the
liability of corporations and their employees. The definition section of the
Environmental Quality Act does, however, include corporations within the term
"person," 363 and the federal government has frequently prosecuted employees
for actions taken in the scope of their corporate duties. 3"

358. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1994)
(Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1994) (Clean Air Act). But see
33 U.S.C. § 1319(cX I ) (1994) (misdemeanor penalty for negligent violations of the Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (1994) (misdemeanor penalty for negligent violations of the Clean Air
Act).
359. Compare United States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1992), with United States v.
Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1991). See also United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912
F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919, 111 S.Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Pozsgai, 757
F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa.), afl'd 947 F.2d 938 (3d Cir. 1991).
360. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f) (1994) (defining "knowing" and "serious bodily injury" for
purposes of the "knowingly endangered" provision ofthe Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
361. La. K.S. 30:2025(F)(l(b) (Supp. 1996).
362. La. I.S. 30:2025(F)(lXa) (Supp. 1996).
363. La. IKS. 30:2004(8) (1989).
364. E.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Baytank, Inc.,
934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
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The Hazardous Waste Control Law establishes three additional crimes. It
provides criminal penalties for two types of substantive violations. In addition, it
subjects certain reporting and monitoring violations to lesser penalties.
The more serious ofthe substantive provisions in the Hazardous Waste Control
Law carries a maximum penalty of "a fine of not more than two hundred fifty
thousand dollars per day ofviolation and costs ofprosecution" and "imprisonment
at hard labor for not more than fifteen years." It covers "[a]ny person who
knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or exports any substance in
contravention of the provisions" of the Hazardous Waste Control law or a
regulation, license, or permit issued under the law as well as "any person who
otherwise knowingly violates" the law. It only applies, however, when a person has
acted "in such manner that he knows, or should have known, at that time that he
thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
'3
injury. 65
The less severe ofthe substantive criminal provisions applies to "[a]ny person
who willfully or knowingly discharges, emits, or disposes of any substance in
contravention ofany provision" of the Hazardous Waste Control Law or any rule,
permit, or license issued pursuant to the law and to "any person who otherwise
knowingly violates any provision" of the law. The maximum penalty provided for
a violation is "a fine of not more than one hundred thousand dollars per day of
violation and costs of prosecution, or imprisonment at hard labor for not more than
ten years, or both." 3" Unlike the general enforcement section, the Hazardous
Waste Control Law does not expressly make a conviction for violating the less
severe substantive provision a responsive verdict to a charge of violating the more
severe provision discussed in the preceding paragraph. Because the substantive
criminal provisions of the Hazardous Waste Control law differ with respect to
mental element and the acts they specifically enumerate, defendants are certain to
argue that the legislature declined to make the lesser offense a responsive verdict.
The legislature added the section providing criminal penalties for certain
reporting and monitoring violations in a 1990 amendment to the Hazardous Waste
Control Law. The amendment covers "any person who knowingly omits material
information" in an "application, record, label, manifest, report, plan, or other
document filed or required to be maintained" under the law as well as any person
who "knowingly and intentionally makes any false statement, representation, or
certification" in such a document. The monitoring violations apply to any person
"who falsifies, intentionally tampers with, or knowingly renders inaccurate any
monitoring device or method required to be maintained" under the law. The
maximum penalty for reporting or monitoring violations is "a fine of not more that
twenty-five thousand dollars or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
367
both."

365.

La. R.S. 30:2183(G)(2) (1989).

366.
367.

La. R.S. 30:2183(GX) (1989).
La. LS. 30:2183(G)(3) (1989).
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In addition to the ambiguity regarding responsive verdicts, the criminal
provisions of the Hazardous Waste Control Law raise many of the same issues
as the criminal provisions of the general enforcement section of the Environmental Quality Act. The mental element is unclear, and the provisions are
ambiguous as to the elements to which the mental state applies. Furthermore,
the legislature has neither provided a definition of what constitutes placing a
person "in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" nor expressly
stated whether corporations and corporate employees are subject to the criminal
penalties.
In 1993, the legislature added a special set of criminal provisions to the
Water Control Law. The amendment makes it a crime to violate the Louisiana
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System negligently or knowingly and provides
enhanced penalties when the violator knows that the violation "places another
person in imminent danger of death or seriously bodily injury. 368 However,
the criminal provisions are not yet operative. The Louisiana Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System only came into existence 361 when the federal government
delegated authority to the state to operate the discharge permit program required
by Section 402 of the Clean Water Act. 370 The federal government has granted
final approval to Louisiana's program effective August 27, 1996. 37 ,
VI. ENFORCEMENT BY PRIVATE PARTIES

A. Citizen Suits
Like many federal statutes," the Louisiana Environmental Quality Act has
a citizen suit provision that allows private parties to seek judicial enforcement
of the Act.373 Although the Louisiana provision appears to have been modeled
on the federal statutes, the state's courts may reject some of the restrictive
interpretations that federal courts have embraced with respect to the federal
statutes.

368. La. R.S. 30:2076(C) (Supp. 1996).
369. La. R.S. 30:2073(1) (Supp., 1996).
370. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
371. 61 Fed. Reg. 47,932 (1996).
372. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1994) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (Clean Air Act).
373. La. R.S. 30:2026 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see generally Christopher Gobert, Citizen Suits
in the Populist State, 2 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 57 (1989).
The citizen suit provision of the Environmental Quality Act appears to be a unique feature of
Louisiana law. The environmental statutes administered by the Commissioner of Agriculture, see,
e.g., La. R.S. 3:3201-3377 (1996), and the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, La. R.S.
32:1501-1521 (1989), have no similar provisions. However, persons who are "adversely affected"
may enforce the conservation laws and orders of the state when the Commissioner of Conservation
fails to do so. See La. R.S. 30:16 (1989).
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Subsection A defines the scope of the citizen suit provision. It allows "any
person having an interest, which is or may be, adversely affected," to file a civil
action "on his own behalf against any person whom he alleges to be in violation"
of the Environmental Quality Act or rules promulgated under the Act. Proper
venue lies "in the district court in the parish in which the violation or alleged
violation occurs or in the district court of the domicile of the alleged violator,"
and the district court must afford the citizen suit "preferential hearing." If the
district court finds "that a violation has occurred, or is occurring," it may "assess
a civil penalty not to exceed ten thousand dollars for each day of the continued
noncompliance." The court may also, "if appropriate, issue a temporary or
permanent injunction.""' In addition, the court may "award costs of court
including reasonable attorneys and expert witness fees to the prevailing party"
and "may also award actual damages to the prevailing plaintiff."
Subsection B limits the authority to file a civil suit in four ways. First, the
plaintiff cannot file the action "prior to thirty days" after giving "notice to the
secretary and the alleged violator." Second, a citizen suit may not be commenced "[i]f the secretary ...

has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a

civil or criminal action in a court of this state to require compliance with any
standard, limitation, or order." However, anyone who could have filed a citizen
suit may intervene in the secretary's enforcement action "as a matter of right."
Third, the Environmental Quality Act does not permit a citizen suit "[i]f the
alleged violator is operating under a variance and is in compliance with the terms
of such variance." Fourth, a plaintiff cannot file a citizen suit against any person
who is, "with respect to the same violation," complying with "any order issued
pursuant" to the Act; who is a "defendant in a civil suit brought under the
provisions of R.S. 30:2025"; or who is the "subject of an action to assess and
[to] collect a civil penalty pursuant to R.S. 30:2025(E)."
The citizen suit provision is supplementary to other remedies available to
injured parties. "[N]othing herein shall be construed to limit or deny any
person's right to injunctive or other extraordinary and ordinary relief under the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure or otherwise under Louisiana law, other than
this Section."3"7 Furthermore, the statute also provides that "[t]he enforcement,
procedures, and remedies herein provided for shall be in addition to any such
procedures authorized under the laws of this state. 376
When compared to the federal provisions on which it was modeled, the
Louisiana citizen suit provision has two distinct advantages. For one example,
the Louisiana statute allows the court to award damages to a prevailing party, a
remedy that is generally not available under federal law."' For another, the

374. Cf.La. R.S. 30:2025(G) (Supp. 1996) (no express provision for injunctive relief); see supra
note 324 and accompanying text.
375. La. R.S. 30:2026(C) (1989).
376. La. R.S. 30:2026(D) (1989).
377. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammer Ass'n, 453 U.S. I,
101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981).
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state law applies to past violations as well as those that are continuing at the time
the citizen suit is filed whereas the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
the Clean Water Act only allows citizen suits for violations that are occurring
when the citizen suit is filed.37
The damages remedy is potentially important. Arguably, it creates a new
tort with only two elements: violation of the Environmental Quality Act plus a
causal relationship between the violation and the "actual damages" suffered by
the plaintiff. Moreover, actual damages may include the restoration costs that
are provided when the state seeks judicial relief under the general enforcement
section.379
Unlike federal citizen suit provisions, the Louisiana statute does not allow
suits to force the secretary to perform nondiscretionary duties. That omission is
probably not particularly significant, however. The Code of Civil Procedure
already authorizes writs of mandamus to require a public official to perform a
Alternatively, the courts might construe a failure to
mandatory duty.3"
perform a mandatory duty as a violation of the Act that is covered by the citizen
suit provision.
In at least one respect, the citizen suit provision of the Environmental
Quality Act is less favorable than the typical provisions found in federal statutes:
the Louisiana statute expressly bars a citizen suit when a violation is the subject
of any judicial or administrative enforcement effort. It precludes a citizen suit
whenever an alleged violator is operating in compliance with a variance, has
received a compliance order with respect to the same violation, is a defendant in
a civil enforcement action, or is the subject of an administrative action to assess
a penalty.3"' By contrast, federal environmental statutes originally only barred
citizen suits when the Environmental Protection Agency was "diligently"
Recent amendments to the Clean
pursuing a enforcement action in court."
Water Act have, however, j>recluded the use of citizen suits to assess penalties
for violations for which administrative penalties have been imposed, 38 3 and
some
3 lower federal courts have interpreted the new amendments quite expansively. 84

378. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 108 S. Ct.
376 (1987).
379. See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
380. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3861-66.

381.

La. R.S. 30:2026(BX3)-(4) (1989).

382. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(bXI)(B) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(bX1)(B)
(1994) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1994) (Clean Air Act).
Compare Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1987), and Friends of the
Earth v.Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985), with Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.,

592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1979).
383.
384.

33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (1994).
See, e.g., Arkansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d 376 (8th Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995). But see Coalition for a Liveable West Side, Inc., v. New York

City Dept. of Environmental Protection, 830 F. Supp. 194 (S.D. N.Y. 1993).
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The impact of the additional grounds for barring citizen suits in the
Louisiana statute may not be as great as it seems at first glance. Under
Louisiana law, citizens have substantial rights to intervene in administrative and
judicial enforcement actions... and to appeal administrative enforcement
decisions.'" Thus, a collusive administrative enforcement effort to preclude
a citizen suit may not completely avoid citizen participation in the enforcement
process.
The broader preclusion provision of the state statute may have discouraged
the filing of citizen suits in Louisiana. At any rate, few judicial decisions have
construed the citizen suit provision of the Environmental Quality Act. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the language of the statute raises a number of unresolved
issues.
Although the statute requires notice to the secretary and to the alleged
violator, no Louisiana decision has ruled whether failure to provide notice
requires dismissal of the suit, as the United States Supreme Court has held is
required for noncompliance with the notice requirements of the citizen suit
provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act."' Nor does the
Louisiana statute prescribe the form in which notice is to be given, beyond
requiring that it be provided by certified mail, return receipt requested."" At
the federal level, the Environmental Protection Agency has issued regulations
governing notice in citizen suits," 9 but the secretary has not promulgated
comparable rules at the state level. In the absence of such rules, presumably any
written notice will suffice.
The scope of the citizen's right to intervene is also unclear. The statute
precludes a citizen suit when "the secretary or ...[the secretary's] legal counsel
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court
of this state," but it allows an aggrieved party to intervene "in any such
proceeding ...

as a matter of right." 3

The language suggests that the right

to intervene extends to criminal proceedings, but the courts may resist that
linguistic interpretation for at least two reasons. First, private parties normally
have no role in criminal prosecutions. Second, the secretary does not "commence" or "prosecute" criminal cases; even the Environmental Quality Act
recognizes that responsibility belongs to local district attorneys."

385.

See, e.g., La. RS.30:2025(EX5),2026B(2)(1989). Seealso ConnecticutCoastalFishermen's

Ass'n v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 173 (D. Conn.1991), modified, 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir.
1994) (ight of intervention under citizen suit provisions of federal environmental laws).
386. In re Recovery I, Inc., 622 So. 2d 272 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 629 So. 2d 383
(1993); In re BASF Corp., 533 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ granted on other grounds,
539 So. 2d 624, writ denied, 541 So. 2d 900 (1989).
387. Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S.Ct. 304 (1990).
388. La. K.S. 30:2026(B)(1) (1989).
389. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 135.1..5 (1995) (notice under the citizen suit section of the Clean
Water Act).
390. La. R.S. 30:2026(BX2) (1989).
391. La. R.S. 30:2025(F) (1989); see supra note 351 and accompanying text.
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A third issue raised by the text of the statute is whether the plaintiff's right
to recover damages extends to cases in which the plaintiff intervenes. If not, the
secretary's enforcement of the Act could preclude a private party's right to
recover damages as well as the right to obtain injunctive relief and penalties. On
the other hand, granting an intervening plaintiff the right to recover damages

could preclude the secretary from settling or compromising the state's claims,
even when the attorney general has agreed to the settlement or compromise.
B. Other Remedies Available to PrivateParties
The devices for enforcing environmental statutes do not preclude recourse
92
to other remedies, such as those available under general property or tort law.
The citizen suit section expressly preserves "any person's right to injunctive or
other extraordinary and ordinary relief."3 93 Moreover, the first circuit has
rejected the argument that a permit from the Department of Environmental
Quality precludes an injured party's from recovering damages caused by the
permittee's pollution. 9'
C. Attorney Fees
Louisiana follows the "American rule," which ordinarily requires litigants
to pay their own attorney fees regardless of who prevails in litigation. 9s The
American rule admits exceptions, and the Louisiana Supreme Court has
recognized three. It has allowed the prevailing party in a lawsuit to recover legal
fees from the losing party when a contract between the parties provides for
payment of attorney fees, when a statute authorizes recovery, and when the
actions of the plaintiff have created a "common fund" to which attorney fees
may appropriately be charged.
392. See La. Civ. C. arts. 667-669, 2315-2319; see also Butler v. Baber, 529 So. 2d 374 (La.
1988). See generally Kenneth M. Murchison, Interstate Pollution: The Needfor Federal Common
Law, 6 Va. J.Nat. Resources L. 1 (1986). Prior to this year, the state's general tort law expressly
provides for exemplary damages in cases that involve "wanton or reckless disregard for public safety
in the storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances," but the legislature
repealed this provision in the 1996 special session. 1996 La. Acts No. 2, § 1;La. Civ. C. art. 2315.3.
See. e.g., Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994). Compare Tillman v. CSX Transportation Co., 617 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993). with Broussard v. Rogers. 628 So. 2d 1351 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1993).
393. La. R.S. 30:2026(C) (1989).
394. McCastle v,.
Rollins Environmental Services of La., 415 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ
denied, 420 So. 2d 449 (1982).
395. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Bossier Bank & Trust Co., 475 So. 2d 1082 (La. 1985); Nassau
Realty Co., Inc. v. Brown, 332 So. 2d 206 (La. 1976); Sierra Club v. Louisiana Dept. of Wildlife &
Fisheries, 560 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990). For a detailed description of the development
of the American rule, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.
Ct. 1612 (1975). See also Robert L. Boese, Liabilityfor Attorney Fees in Environmental Litigation,

38 La. B.J. 93 (1990).
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The first exception has little applicability in environmental litigation. Because
the plaintiff in an environmental action seldom has a contractual relationship with
the defendant, contractual provisions shifting attorney fees are rare.
The Louisiana citizen suit provision3 falls within the second of the
exceptions. It allows "the prevailing party" to recover "costs of litigation,
including reasonable attorneys and expert witness fees" in a suit based on a
violation ofthe Environmental Quality Act. Because few reported decisions have
construed the citizen suit provision, the precise scope of this provision remains
uncertain. 3
No reported decisions have defined who is a "prevailing party" or what are
"reasonable attorney fees." Because the terms were drawn from the citizen suit
provisions of federal environmental laws,39 federal decisions may provide
guidance for construing the Louisiana statute.'" State law, however, allows
contingency fees in other contexts, and so the Louisiana Supreme Court may
decline to follow federal decisions that have refused to enhance normal hourly
rates for the possibility that an environmental plaintiff might lose a novel
environmental case.'
Although the citizen suit provision of the Environmental Quality Act is a
notable exception in Louisiana law, the Administrative Procedure Act includes
a more limited provision for attorney fees. It allows a "small business" to
recover "reasonable litigation expenses" when it successfully challenges an
agency action in which "the agency acted without substantial justification. " "
The Louisiana Supreme Court has also recognized the "common fund"
exception to the rule barring recovery of attorney fees, 02 although it has not
yet used it in an environmental case. The fourth circuit restrictively construed
the exception to deny attorney fees to plaintiffs who had successfully challenged
the awarding of dredging permits in violation of the state's public bid laws.403

396. La. R.S. 30:2026 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see supra notes 372-391 and accompanying text.
397. One important limitation in the citizen suit provision is obvious. It only applies to
violations of the Environmental Quality Act. It does not encompass suits for damages or penalties
based on violations of other environmental laws. See Mayor and Council v. Ascension Parish Police
Jury, 506 So. 2d 773 (La. App. IstCir. 1987).
398. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1994) (Clean Water Act). The Clean Air Act allows the
court to award attorney fees when "appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1994). See Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S. Ct. 3078 (1987); Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
399. See, e.g., Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Russell, 946 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1991);
National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988). But see Meredity v. Ieyoub,
672 So. 2d 375 (La. App. IstCir.), writ granted, 676 So. 2d 1094 (1996) (attorney general lacks
authority to enter contingency agreement without express legislative authorization).
400. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992); Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 107 S.Ct. 3078 (1987).
401.
La. R.S. 49:965.1 (1987); cf.5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994) (Federal Equal Access to Justice Act).
402. See In re Interstate Trust & Banking Co., 235 La. 825, 106 So. 2d 276 (1958).
403. Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department ofWildlife & Fisheries, 560 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1990).

19971

KENNETH M. MURCHISON

.559

According to the court of appeal, an essential condition of the "common fund"
exception requires that the fund arise "solely" by virtue of the attorney's efforts.
Because public bids for new leases (which the plaintiffs opposed) were necessary
before the state realized the increased revenues from the dredging leases, the
exception was not applicable.
VII. CONCLUSION
An accurate analysis of the enforcement provisions of the Louisiana
Environmental Quality Act requires careful attention to both statutory text and
judicial decisions. Although the enforcement options of state law are modeled
on federal environmental statutes, federal law is not always a reliable guide to
the details of the Environmental Quality Act. In the state law, the legislature has
provided an impressive set of tools for enforcing pollution control regulations.
Nonetheless, improvements in the statutory scheme are still needed.
At least three important differences have distinguished Louisiana law from
the federal models on which it is based: greater unity exists with respect to
enforcement options under state law, provisions similar to federal statutes have
different meanings in Louisiana law, and state law has placed greater emphasis
on administrative enforcement.
The unity of enforcement options under state law is a major improvement
upon the federal statutes on which state law is largely based. Each federal
statute contains separate enforcement provisions;' although most are similar,
they are not identical. By contrast, the general enforcement sections of the
Environmental Quality Act 5 apply to violations of all of the statutes administered by the Department of Environmental Quality. This consolidation permits
a more coordinated enforcement effort. It is a statutory reform that Congress
would do well to emulate.40 Unfortunately, the Louisiana legislature itself has
compromised this desirable aspect of state law in the Hazardous Waste Control
Law' and the Water Control Law;' 8 it should avoid additional compromises in the future.
The wording of the enforcement provisions ofthe Environmental Quality Act
is frequently similar to the text of federal statutes. Nevertheless, the meaning of
state and federal law is not always identical. The authorization for the issuance
of compliance orders is a good example of a difference between state and federal
law. Because federal compliance orders are not final agency actions, they do not

404. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1994) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994) (Clean Air Act).
405. La. R.S. 30:2025 (1989).
406. See generally Kenneth M. Murchison, Reforming Environmental Enforcement: Lessons
From Twenty Years of Waiving FederalImmunity to State Regulation, 11 Va. Env. L.J. 179, 229

(1992).
407.
408.

La. R.S. 30:2183(G) (1989); see supra notes 363-367.
La. R.S. 30:2076.1, 2076.2 (Supp. 1996); see supranotes 368-370 and accompanying text.
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mandate administrative process orjudicial review-even though polluters violate
them at their peril.'
By contrast, the Louisiana compliance order is a binding
administrative determination with two significant consequences. It increases the
size of the civil penalty to which the violator is subject,' and the department
can use summary judicial process to enforce its provisions.4" Not only is the
Louisiana provision fairer to alleged violators, it also gives the agency an
additional administrative option that is not available to federal regulators."
A second example of state law differing from its federal model is the citizen
suit provision." 3 On the one hand, state law covers past violations and permits
damage awards. On the other, state law is more willing than federal law to
allow administrative enforcement actions to bar a citizen suit.
In the past, the greatest difference between state and federal enforcement has
probably been the state's greater reliance on administrative enforcement. State
law permits administrative assessment of civil penalties as large as those that can
be imposed judicially. In addition, until October 1, 1996, the secretary had the
authority to make the final administrative decision. Thus, the department has had
little incentive to file judicial enforcement actions, other than suits to collect
penalties that have been administratively assessed.
The significant enforcement authority that the Louisiana Environmental
Quality Act confers on the Secretary ofthe Department of Environmental Quality
has been one of the greatest strengths of the Act. In particular, administrative
imposition of civil penalties is essential if effective enforcement ofenvironmental
standards is to be achieved. If violators incur no financial loss, environmental
regulations create a perverse competitive advantage for those who wait until they
are caught to comply with pollution control standards. Without administrative
penalties, the expense of judicial enforcement would reduce the number of
penalties that the department can impose.
For the reasons summarized in the preceding paragraph, the change made in
Act 739 of 1995 was particularly unfortunate. Transferring the department's
hearing officers to the Department of Civil Service has the desirable effect of
increasing the reality and appearance of administrative fairness. Renaming the

409. Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner, 58 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 771
(1996); Southern Pines Assoc. v. United States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (Clean Water Act);
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. EPA, 554 F.2d 885, 891 (8th Cir. 1977) (Clean Air Act).
410. La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(2) (1989).
411. La. R.S. 30:2025(G)(2) (1989).
412.
Louisiana regulators could achieve a functional equivalent of the federal compliance order
through creative use of the notice of violation. By issuing a notice of violation together with a

recommended corrective action, the department could advise the violator of what needed to be done
without committing itselfto providing any administrative process. If the violator refused to take the
department's advice, the department could consider the violator's "recalcitrance" in setting a civil
penalty, La. R.S. 30:2025(E)(3)(iv) (1989), or the department could recommend criminal prosecution
because the violator acted "willfully or knowingly" by continuing the violation after the notice of
violation was served. La. R.S. 30:2025(F) (1989).
413. La. R.S. 30:2026 (1989 and Supp. 1996); see supra notes 378-384 and accompanying text.
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hearing officers administrative law judges and giving them final responsibility
for the administrative decision dilutes the secretary's duty to serve as the state's
primary trustee of the environment.
Both the Louisiana legislature and the state's supreme court have wisely
recognizid that environmental activists have a vital role to play if environmental
standards are to be enforced effectively. The participation of activists helps to
minimize two dangers: "capture" of the agency by the regulated community and
bureaucratic indifference to environmental dangers. Under the Environmental
Quality Act, citizens can appeal administrative penalties"' and participate when
administrative hearings are held on contested penalties.'
Alternatively,
individual citizens and environmental groups can file citizen suits to enforce
violations that the department ignores and to recover damages caused by those
violations." 6
The Supreme Court's decision in All Pro Paintconfirms a third strength of
Louisiana environmental enforcement provisions-the possibility of serious
criminal punishment for intentional violations ofenvironmental regulations. Only
time will tell whether criminal prosecutions become an actual, as opposed to a
theoretical, risk for egregious violators. What is clear is that, in light ofAll Pro
Paint,the Environmental Quality Act gives district attorneys the tools they need
to prosecute criminal violations.
Despite these positive aspects of the enforcement provisions in the
Environmental Quality Act, reforms are needed. The legislature should amend
the statute to restore the secretary's authority as final decisionmaker in all
administrative enforcement actions, make administrative enforcement actions
appealable to the First Circuit Court of Appeal rather than to the Nineteenth
Judicial District Court, allow emergency cease and desist orders to extend
beyond fifteen days, provide streamlined procedures for minor penalties,
consolidate and clarify the criminal penalties, and modify the conditions that bar
a citizen suit. In addition, the secretary should complete the job of updating the
procedural rules applicable to administrative enforcement, and the secretary
should issue new rules to standardize the amounts of civil penalties.
Act 41 of 1996 makes administrative enforcement actions appealable to the
district court rather than to the court of appeal. Because the district court's
review is confined to the administrative record, the lower court's review is the
same as would be available in the court of appeal. Thus, the new legislation
wastes both administrative and judicial resources, and the legislature should
eliminate the district court review.

414. La. I.S. 30:2024(8), 2050.21(A) (Supp. 1996), as amended and added by 1995 La. Acts
No. 947, §§ 1,2; In re BASF Corp., 533 So. 2d 971 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988), writ granted on other
grounds, 539 So. 2d 624, writ denied, 541 So. 2d 900 (1989).
415. La. R.S. 30:2050.4(B), (1), 2050.7(B), (D) (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 247-248 and
accompanying text.
416. La. R.S. 30:2026 (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 372-391 and accompanying text.
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As explained above, the legislature unwisely amended the Environmental
Quality Act in 1995 to allow the administrative law judge rather than the
secretary to make the final administrative decision in enforcement actions. The
legislature should repeal this change.
The Environmental Quality Act grants the secretary extremely broad
authority to issue emergency cease and desist orders, but the orders expire after
fifteen days regardless of the threat to the environment. To continue the order
requires the filing of a civil action, but the secretary is better able than a judge
to evaluate the environmental threat posed by a violation. A preferable
procedure would allow the secretary to extend the cease and desist order, but
make the order immediately appealable and require that the secretary offer the
alleged violator a preliminary administrative hearing before the order is
extended." 7
The Act requires that an alleged violator be offered an opportunity for a
formal adjudicatory hearing with respect to a compliance order or penalty
assessment."a Although the penalties authorized for violations are substantial,
most of the penalties that the agency actually imposes are fairly small.4 9
Federal statutes establish expedited procedures for minor administrative
penalties,420 and those procedures seem adequate to satisfy the requirements of
due process."2' The Louisiana legislature was wise to allow the secretary to
streamline the state process for minor enforcement actions, but it should not have
required the respondent's consent to invoke those procedures.
Legislative revision could improve the criminal provisions of the Environmental Quality Act in at least three respects. First, the legislature should move
the criminal provisions of the Hazardous Waste Control Law and the Water
Control Law to the general enforcement section. Consolidation of enforcement
provisions is one of the major accomplishments of the Louisiana statute, and the

417. This administrative procedure would be analogous to the judicial proceedings for
injunctions. The Code of Civil Procedure allows a temporary restraining order to be issued exparte,
La. Code Civ. P. art. 3603; but it requires a hearing before the judge may issue a temporary or
permanent injunction. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3602, 3603.
418. La. R.S. 30:2025(CX3), 2050.2-4 (Supp. 1996); see supra notes 168-169, 244-245 and
accompanying text.
419. According to a document the Department of Environmental Quality furnished to an advisory
committee of the Louisiana Law Institute, the amount of most civil penalties assessed by the
department in 1991-1992 was less than $7500. Letter dated Sept. 9, 1992 from Donald Trahan,
Department of Environmental Quality, to James J. Carter, Staff Attorney, Louisiana Law Institute.
420. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(g)(2)(A) (1994) (Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3)
(1994) (Clean Air Act).
421. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); United States v. Healy
Tibbitts Constr. Co., 713 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Crooksville Coal Co., 560 F.
Supp. 141 (S.D. Ohio 1982). See generally William Funk, Close Enough for Government
Work?-Using Informal Procedures For Imposing Administrative Penalties, 24 Scion Hall L. Rev.
1 (1993). For a discussion of Louisiana cases analyzing the requirements of due process in the
context of public employment, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Developments in the Law,, 19861987-Local Government Law, 48 La. L. Rev. 303, 322-26 (1987).
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crimes in the Hazardous Waste Control Law and the Water Control Law are the
major exceptions to that consolidation. Second, the legislature should clarify the
mental element of the environmental crimes by using the normal intent language
of the Criminal Code" and by specifying the elements to which the mental
element applies. Third, the legislature should amend the text of the crimes in the
Hazardous Waste Control Law to make clear that the misdemeanor crime is a
responsive verdict to the felony charge. 23
Legislative revisions could also improve the citizen suit section in at least
three respects. First, a variance or compliance order should bar a citizen suit for
future violations only if two conditions are satisfied: the compliance order was
issued before the citizens notified the agency of their intent to sue and the
citizens have been afforded a meaningful opportunity to challenge the variance
or order. Second, the statute should expressly state that a variance or compliance
order never bars a citizen suit to collect civil penalties for a violation that
occurred prior to the issuance of the variance or order. Third, no governmental
enforcement action should ever bar a citizen suit to recover damages that the
violation caused to persons or property.
In addition to these legislative reforms, the secretary should issue rules that
would improve environmental enforcement. For one thing, the secretary should
complete the revision of the enforcement procedures in the rules of the
Environmental Control Commission to conform to current agency practice and
to make agency practice consistent among the various offices. For another, the
secretary should implement the legislative directive in the enforcement
section 2' and standardize the size of administrative penalties, at least for
routine violations. To the extent that penalties become more predictable,
violators will be less likely to incur the costs of challenging them within the
agency and in the courts. In addition, penalty rules will also confine the
authority of administrative law judges to overrule the secretary's decision as to
the appropriate size of a civil penalty.
As is usual with environmental statutes, Louisiana's Environmental Quality
Act is a glass that is both half empty and half full. Legislative and administrative reform can improve the statute. The need for those reforms should not,
however, blind the department or the public to the opportunities for meaningful
enforcement that the legislature has already provided.

422.
423.
424.

La. Crim. Code arts. 10, 11; see supra notes 357-358 and accompanying text.
See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
La. R.S. 30:2050.1(A) (Supp. 1996).

